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ABSTRACT 
EARNINGS RISK AND THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET 
by 
Phillip Michael Oberg 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott Drewianka 
The goal of this dissertation is to develop, refine, and employ empirical measures of 
earnings risk—especially permanent risk—and determine their effect on behavior, with 
applications specific to the recent mortgage bubble. 
Chapter 1 aims to identify covariates of risks associated with permanent and 
temporary earnings shocks. The distinction is significant both because permanent shocks 
are more consequential and because measurement error would contaminate only 
measures of temporary risks. Generalizing methods used in previous work, we allow risk 
to vary both across individuals and over individuals’ careers, so they could be used to 
study behavioral responses to risk even with individual fixed effects. We find the 
majority of overall earnings risk is temporary, yet permanent risks vary notably across 
race and education. 
Chapter 2 uses the measures developed in chapter 1 to analyze the information 
structure in the mortgage market during the first decade of the 2000s.  A feature of last 
decade's mortgage crisis was that the credit risk of borrowers was not accurately priced 
ii
into their mortgages (e.g., the increased risk of delinquency was not associated with a 
higher interest rate). I confirm this belief by using a measure of labor earnings risk, a 
major source of risk at the household level. I find that borrowers who are granted a 
mortgage, labor earnings risk measured at origination predicts a greater probability of 
delinquency, yet its relationship to loan terms is weak. Further results also lend evidence 
to theories involving information problems: increases in permanent labor earnings risk 
measured at origination (i) increase borrowers' perceived risk of falling behind on 
payments and (ii) influences lenders' restructuring decisions. This disconnect is not due to 
supply side explanations I can indirectly test such as market distortions induced by 
lending policies. Since I cannot provide clear evidence of lenders' ability to appreciate 
this risk at the point origination, room remains to test the importance of the incentive for 
lenders to resell mortgages in the secondary market. 
Chapter 3 investigates the divergence of the gap in homeownership rates that 
occurred over the entire course of the recent housing-related business cycle. After 
controlling for a rich set of factors determining the willingness and ability to own a home, 
I find that most of the change in the white/non-white homeownership gap, particularly 
during the housing bust, can be explained by observable factors. The main contributors 
are marriage and fertility, especially during the boom; geography, income instability, and 
education also contribute during the bust. 
iii
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents. 
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1 Heterogeneity in Exposure to Permanent and Tempo-
rary Earnings Shocks
1.1 Introduction
The distinction between permanent and temporary earnings shocks has been widely appre-
ciated at least since Friedman’s (1957) seminal work on the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
Just as we expect individuals’ consumption to bear a stronger relationship with their perma-
nent income than to deviations from it, we also expect it to respond much more substantially
to permanent shocks than to temporary ones. Permanent shocks are more consequential not
only due to their greater duration, but also because they cannot be easily smoothed by bor-
rowing and saving. The distinction matters even ex ante: the risk of permanent shocks may
discourage investments with irreversible costs, but in the absence of credit constraints tem-
porary shocks should not have profound effects on behavior, except perhaps to encourage
precautionary savings or to maintain access to credit markets. There are also implications
for data analysis, as errors in reporting individuals’ earnings are much more likely to con-
taminate measures of temporary earnings risk than those of permanent risk (Duncan et al.
1985).
For all of these reasons, it would be desirable to measure the risks of permanent and
temporary earnings shocks separately. Furthermore, to the extent that our interest is moti-
vated by behavioral responses to permanent shocks or the risk thereof, it would be essential
to allow some disaggregation. At the very least, this would involve computing separate
measures of risk for different subgroups of the population, but ideally one would prefer
measures that were computed at the individual level and at relatively high frequencies.
However, presumably because it has been motivated by other issues like trends in aggregate
inequality and churning of the income distribution, most previous work has focused mainly
on measuring risks (or trends in risk) that affect the entire population. Only a few papers
1
have even attempted to construct separate measures of permanent and temporary earnings
risk at the individual level, and none have allowed risks to vary within individuals’ careers.
This paper aims to fill that gap. First, it adapts an empirical approach developed by
Carroll and Samwick (1997) in order to allow risks faced by individuals to change over
time. The implicit assumption that individuals’ earnings risks were constant over time
was not very restrictive for their study because they only analyzed a few years of data,
but relaxing it makes an important difference when we examine observations over several
decades. We then create a second set of estimated risks that vary at the individual level by
adapting a related strategy that Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) had used to measure such risks
at the population level (stratified only by broad levels of education). While motivated by
exactly the same model, the statistics that emerge from these two strategies are computed
quite differently, so we then verify that they lead to similar conclusions. Our results confirm
earlier conclusions that earnings risk is mainly transitory in nature (potentially representing
mostly measurement error), and our estimates of permanent risk are somewhat smaller than
those in previous work, yet they still indicate that a permanent earnings shock that is one
standard deviation in magnitude causes annual earnings to fluctuate by about 10 percent.
We also find that permanent risks vary notably across educational and racial groups.
The following section elaborates on both our goals and the strategies used in previous
research, leading into the adaptations we propose in 1.3. The next two sections describe our
data and the practical details of our estimation procedure; 1.6 then presents the empirical
results; and 1.7 concludes with a few remarks and avenues for future research.
1.2 Estimating Earnings Risk
Analyses of earnings risk begin by decomposing individuals’ earnings (or a similar mea-
sure) into three parts meant to describe the information available to the econometrician and
2
to the individuals themselves:
yigt = F(Ait ;θg)+Q(Ait ;θi,g)+uit , (1)
where yigt represents the log earnings of person i from demographic group g in year t.
Function F represents heterogeneity that can be predicted by the econometrician; it is typ-
ically specified as a polynomial (often a quartic) in the person’s age Ait and perhaps other
factors, with coefficients θ that are common to everyone in group g. The second compo-
nent Q is intended to represent additional heterogeneity that is known to the individual but
not directly observed by the econometrician. In practice this is often specified as an indi-
vidual fixed, or perhaps a random effect whose variance may differ across groups or over
time (e.g., Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994 and Carroll and Samwick 1997), but some models
allow for heterogeneity in expected earnings growth rates by using a higher-order polyno-
mial with person-specific coefficients (Gordon 1984; Haider 2001; Guvenen 2007). The
sum F +Q is then interpreted as the individual’s expectation of his or her own earnings, so
it represents predictable heterogeneity rather than risk.
If so, the final component—the residual uit—represents deviations from the person’s
own expected age-earnings profile, reflecting realizations of risk. Most studies of earn-
ings risk simply attempt to measure the variance of u across large groups of people and/or
over long periods of time. For example, Gottschalk and Moffitt’s (1994) well-known study
uses the variance of these residuals over two long (8-year) periods and across several large
groups of workers (e.g., stratified by broad levels of education or one-digit industries) to
measure the share of cross-sectional earnings inequality that is attributable to transitory
shocks rather than differences in individuals’ permanent incomes. Many other studies at-
tempt to determine only how the variance of u has evolved over time.
Presumably one reason for analyzing aggregates is that individuals actually experience
only a small subset of their potential outcomes, especially over the relatively short periods
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in which they are observed, so aggregating observations across many individuals provides
a more complete view of the potential outcomes. The same idea motivates a slightly differ-
ent approach that has been used in the few studies that have constructed measures of earn-
ings risk that vary across individuals (Carroll and Samwick 1997; Saks and Shore 2005;
Drewianka 2010). In essence, the idea is to assume that individuals with similar characteris-
tics Xit face similar risk, which can then be measured by combining data on outcomes from
many individuals with similar characteristics. This is implemented by first constructing
noisy measures of earnings risk for a sample of individuals based on their own outcomes,
then regressing those measures on their characteristics Xit , and finally interpreting the fitted
values as more accurate measures of the risks the individuals actually faced, even though
they did not experience all of those possible outcomes personally. This approach has also
been characterized as an instrumental variables strategy for overcoming the measurement
error in the original statistics that were computed for each individual (Carroll and Samwick
1997).
Despite the theoretical importance of permanent shocks, relatively few individual-level
studies attempt to examine shocks of different duration. Those that do typically augment
the usual earnings specification (1) with an additional assumption that uit has permanent
and transitory components:
uit = piit + vit (2)
piit = pii(t−1)+ηit . (3)
As the innovation to a the random walk component pi , η is a shock that changes i′s earn-
ings permanently, while the white-noise component vitrepresents a shock that affects i′s
earnings only temporarily.1 Both are assumed to be mean-zero and uncorrelated with one
1A few papers have relaxed the unit root assumption (3) by estimating a similar specification with an
autoregressive (AR) parameter. However, estimates of that parameter typically exceed 0.95 and are not
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another (E[ηitvit ′] = 0 for all t and t ′), with respective variances σ2η i and σ2vi, and perma-
nent shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated over time (E [ηitηit ′] = 0 for all t and t ′), so
any autoregressive components are subsumed into v. Several empirical studies of earnings
dynamics conclude that the transitory component v can be modeled as an MA(1) or MA(2)
process, which implies that its autocorrelation becomes negligible at lags longer than two
years (MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri 2004). Most work
thus proceeds under the assumption
E(vitvi′t ′) = 0 for |t− t ′| ≥ 3. (4)
1.2.1 Carroll and Samwick’s strategy
Carroll and Samwick (1997) propose and implement a strategy for measuring σ2η i and σ2vi
at the individual (household) level. They work with the unpredictable part of the growth
in household i′s earnings between two periods t and (t + k). Under the model above, this
growth can be written as
ui(t+k)−uit =
(
k
∑
j=1
ηi(t+ j)
)
+
(
vi(t+k)− vit
)
, (5)
so under the assumptions above, for k ≥ 3,
E
([
ui(t+k)−uit
]2)
= kσ2η i+2σ
2
vi. (6)
Carroll and Samwick’s approach is thus to compute
(
ui(t+k)−uit
)2 for each (i, t,k), then
for each i, regress
(
ui(t+k)−uit
)2
= kβi+2αi+ εitk. (7)
significantly different from 1 (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004; Karahan and Ozkan 2012), implying the
random walk assumption is appropriate.
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Estimates of βi and αi are then interpreted as measures of σ2η i and σ2vi, respectively. As ex-
plained above, these measures are likely to be extremely noisy, especially when individuals’
reported earnings histories are short.2 Thus, when they use these measures to investigate
households’ precautionary saving behavior, they do not use the estimates of (βi,αi) them-
selves, but rather use fitted values from regressions of (βi,αi) on a vector of characteristics
Xi:
βitk j = Xitψβ + εβ it (8)
αitk j = Xitψα + εα it . (9)
1.2.2 Meghir and Pistaferri’s strategy
A second strategy for measuring the variance of permanent earnings shocks has been pro-
posed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). Like Carroll and Samwick, their approach examines
residual earnings growth that occurs between periods t and (t + k). they multiply it by the
residual earnings growth that occurs over the longer window between periods (t− j) and
(t+ k+q), where j,q > 0. See Figure 1.1 for a visual depiction.
Intuitively, under the model of earnings above, the permament earnings growth between
t and (t+k) is uncorrelated with that between (t− j) and t, and likewise with that between
(t + k) and (t + k+ q). Moreover, under condition (4) the transitory shocks experienced
at times t and (t + k) will be uncorrelated with those experienced at times (t − j) and
(t+k+q). Thus, the expected value of the product described above will be the variance of
2For example, Carroll and Samwick’s study must infer two parameters (αi,βi) for each household from
only nine observations on its earnings growth, one for each possible pair of years in 1981-87 with k∈{3,4,5}.
6
permanent shocks between times t and (t+ k). More formally, for min( j,q)≥ 3
E
(
1
k
[
ui(t+k)−uit
][
ui(t+k+q)−ui(t− j)
])
= E
(
1
k
[
k
∑
h=1
ηi(t+ j)+ vi(t+k)− vit
]
×
[
k+q
∑
h=1− j
ηi(t+ j)+ vi(t+k+q)− vi(t− j)
])
=
1
k
k
∑
h=1
σ2η i(t+h). (10)
Meghir and Pistaferri then interpret (10) as a moment condition and implement it us-
ing k = 1 and assuming that σ2η it = σ2ηt for all i within groups defined by broad levels
of education. Combining this condition with other predictions about the autocovariance
matrix based on the model of earnings dynamics, they estimate the parameters using a
minimum distance estimator. In other words, they essentially compute the mean value of
the statistic on the left-hand side of (10) for three groups stratified by their educational
attainment, while Sabelhaus and Song (2009) subsequently applied the same strategy to
sub-populations defined by age.
1.3 Allowing for Variation Across Individuals and Over Time
Despite their merits, neither of the two method described above generates estimates of per-
manent and transitory risks that differ across people and over their lifetimes. This was
not a concern for either of the studies that developed those methods, but they would be
desirable for investigating the effect of risk on behavior, for instance, particularly if there
were some concern that those choices were affected by unobserved individual characteris-
tics that might be correlated with their exposure to risk. For example, Carroll and Samwick
note that their analysis could understate the relationship between households’ estimated
earnings risk and their wealth if, for instance, differences in risk aversion caused some
individuals both to pursue less-risky careers and to save more. Such problems might be
reduced or avoided by using fixed effects estimates, but this is impossible if estimates of
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earnings risk do not vary over workers’ careers.
This section thus develops extensions of Carroll and Samwick’s and Meghir and Pista-
ferri’s measures that allow additional variation in permanent and transitory earnings risk. In
both cases the new estimator is quite closely related to the original version, except that they
now allow the relevant statistics to be computed at much finer levels of disaggregation. We
also introduce an additional modification to Carroll and Samwick’s approach that is more
robust to trends in the variance of temporary earnings shocks.
1.3.1 Disaggregating Carroll and Samwick’s estimator
We begin by suggesting a minor modification of Carroll and Samwick’s method that allows
risk to vary by time, so the objects we seek to estimate should be written as σ2η it and σ2vit ,
rather than σ2η i and σ2vi. Suppose we have collected residuals from the model in (1) and
constructed the various u′itks required below. Note that (2) and (3) imply (for min( j,k)≥ 3),
σ2vit =−E
([
ui(t+k)−uit
][
uit−ui(t− j)
])
, (11)
while equations (6) and (11) similarly imply
σ2η it =
1
k
E
([
ui(t+k)−uit
]2
+2
[
ui(t+k)−uit
][
uit−ui(t− j)
])
. (12)
Therefore, define the following statistics for each i, t, k, and j:
βitk j ≡ 1k
([
ui(t+k)−uit
]2
+2
[
ui(t+k)−uit
][
uit−ui(t− j)
])
(13)
αitk j ≡ −
(
ui(t+k)−uit
)(
uit−ui(t− j)
)
. (14)
For each j, βitk j is an estimator of (1/k)∑kh=1σ
2
η i(t+h) αitk j is an estimator of σ
2
vit . Of course,
a given individual will not experience his full range of possible outcomes, so these statistics
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will likely be extremely noisy. However, if risks are a function of observed characteristics
X , we can obtain a much better estimate by combining the statistics across people with
similar characteristics and across windows of different lengths j and k. Following Carroll
and Samwick (1997) and Drewianka (2010), if we assume
E(σ2η it |Xit) = Xitψη (15)
E(σ2vit |Xit) = Xitψv, (16)
then we can estimate those variances using fitted values from regressions (8) and (9) above.
This method is also related to the method-of-moments strategy used used by Meghir and
Pistaferri and in much related work from the literature on earnings dynamics. For example,
one could estimate σ2η(X) as the empirically observed moment E(β |X); in other words, the
average value of the β ′s for observations with the same X ′s. Our approach is analogous,
but it simplifies exploration of the cross-sectional variation because the observations remain
disaggregated until the final step.
1.3.2 A more robust variation
Although we have tried to maintain the closest link possible to Carroll and Samwick’s
approach while developing this estimation strategy, it is fairly easy to see that β may be
biased if the variance of transitory shocks is not constant over time. To see this, note that
equation (13) can be rewritten as
βitk j =
1
k
([
u2i(t+k)−u2it
]
−2ui(t− j)
[
ui(t+k)−uit
])
(17)
=
1
k
(
ui(t+k)−uit
)(
ui(t+k)+uit−2ui(t− j)
)
. (18)
Then the for min(k, j)≥ 3 the model implies
9
E(β ) =
1
k
E
([
k
∑
h=1
ηi(t+h)+ vi(t+k)− vit
]
×
[
k
∑
h=1
ηi(t+h)+2
0
∑
h=1− j
ηi(t+h)+ vi(t+k)+ vit−2vi(t− j)
])
(19)
=
1
k
(
k
∑
h=1
σ2η i(t+h)+σ
2
vi(t+k)−σ2vit
)
. (20)
Thus, β is biased if σ2vi(t+k) 6= σ2vit , which is troubling in light of evidence that the transitory
earnings risk has increased over time (Haider 2001; Shin and Solon 2011)—suggesting
E(β ) is apt to overstate σ2η it . This was not necessarily a problem for Carroll and Samwick’s
study, as they tried (in effect) to estimate the average σ2vi over time, and σ2vi may plausibly
be assumed constant over the relatively short period they examine. However, we shall show
that this bias is more worrisome in our study.
Fortunately this shortcoming can be overcome with a simple modification. Our αitk j
statistics are unbiased estimators of σ2vit for each period, so we can use them to remove the
transitory variances in equation (20) directly. Specifically, we can compute an unbiased
estimate of σ2η it as
β ∗itk j ≡ βitk j− (αi(t+k)k j−αitk j). (21)
1.3.3 Disaggregating Meghir and Pistaferri’s estimator
Similarly, we can disaggregate Meghir and Pistaferri’s approach by defining a new statistic
γitk jq ≡ 1k
(
ui(t+k)−uit
)(
ui(t+k+q)−ui(t− j)
)
. (22)
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The model then implies for all ( j,q) with min( j,q)≥ 3,
E(γitk jq) =
1
k
k
∑
r=1
σ2η i(t+r).
For the sake of comparison, we can also define a new measure of transitory risk analo-
gous to αitk j by
φitk jq ≡
(
ui(t+k)−uit
)2− k · γitk jq
2
. (23)
1.3.4 Comparing the two approaches
One shortcoming of Carroll and Samwick’s approach is that it can only estimate the av-
erage level of earnings risk over a relatively long period in which it may not actually be
constant, particularly if the agent changes (e.g. jobs or locations). Algebraically speaking,
the problem arises because the α and β (see equations 13 and 14) involve several terms
like uitui(t+k), for example, so it becomes critical that E(uitui(t+k)) = 0. As we have noted,
prior empirical evidence shows that this condition holds only for k ≥ 3, so we are limited
to considering differences in earnings over a period of at least 3 years in order to avoid
confounding permanent earnings shocks with others that are moderately persistent.
In contrast, our generalization of the Meghir-Pistaferri approach places no minimum re-
quirement on k. While it does require min( j,q)≥ 3, γ is an unbiased estimator even for k as
small as 1. This can be seen intuitively using the “overlapping windows” analogy depicted
in Figure 1.1: unlike β or β ∗, the γ statistic does not involve any products between the
residuals from the two ends of the interior window (though it does involve several prod-
ucts between those values and the those from the bounds of the outer window), so there
is no cause to worry whether the residuals from those two “interior” periods were corre-
lated. In other words, γ allows us to identify the relationship between changes in workers’
time-varying characteristics (e.g., industry, occupation) and their risk of permanent earn-
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ings shocks over the shortest period possible. In practice, we shall implement the method
using k = 2. this choice may be preferable in principle considering that some shocks may
occur in the middle of the year, and it is a more practical choice for our data because it
eventually becomes biennial.
Another advantage of the disaggregated Meghir-Pistaferri approach is is the ability to
compute more estimates of σ2η it and σ2vit using the same data series. For each (i, t,k) we can
compute one βitk j for each j, but one γitk jq for each combination ( j,q), providing additional
evidence that helps to cull the signal from the noise. For example, in the empirical exercise
below, we will ultimately construct about 360,000 γ statistics versus “only” 145,000 β
statistics. However, this is not just an advantage relative to our disaggregation of Carroll
and Samwick’s approach, as Meghir and Pistaferri’s original approach used only one of the
many possible combinations of ( j,q).3
It should also be stressed that the choice of k is now irrelevant—-γ is an unbiased
estimator even for k as small as 1. A consequent advantage is we can now identify the
relationship between changes in workers’ time-varying characteristics (e.g., industry, oc-
cupation) and their risk of permanent earnings shocks over the narrowest possible window.
In practice, we shall implement the method using k = 2; this choice may be preferable in
principle considering that some shocks may occur in the middle of the year, and it is a more
practical choice for our data because it eventually becomes biennial.
On the other hand, one advantage of the disaggregated Carroll-Samwick approach is
the ability to compute estimates using shorter panels. If we define ζ as the minimal lag or
lead used, the α and β statistics require the respondent to appear in the data for (2ζ + 1)
years, whereas the φ and γ statistics require (2ζ + 1+ k) years. In practice, we will use
ζ = 4 and k = 2 for the γ ′s, so we need earnings observations over a period of at least 9
years to compute the β statistic, but over a period of at least 11 years to compute the γ
statistic.
3Specifically, Meghir and Pistaferri implement their moment condition for (k, j,q) = (1,2,2); in other
words, the sample statistic they use to for the parameters is E
[(
ui(t+1)−uit
)(
ui(t+3)−ui(t−2)
)]
.
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1.4 Data
The data examined below are from the 1970-2007 waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), where possible using the version recoded for use by the Cross-National
Equivalent File (CNEF). Although the CNEF was originally intended to harmonize the
PSID for comparison with longitudinal studies from other countries, the main advantages
of using it here are that the variables in the CNEF are coded consistently over time and
that this version of the data have been used at least once to analyze earnings risk at the
individual (Drewianka 2010). See Burkhauser et al. (2000) for a more extended discussion
of the CNEF. The range of years used allows us to compute annual risk estimates from
1972-2003 using the “β” approach and from 1974-2001 using the “γ” approach.
From this survey, we extract a sample of men aged 16-65 who are not disabled or stu-
dents, and who report positive earnings. We exclude women mainly to avoid confounding
our estimates of earnings risk with the wage affects associated with women’s lower (but
rapidly increasing) rates of labor force participation, which could easily be mistaken for
permanent shocks. One might also be concerned that the positive earnings requirement
may unnecessarily omit men who experience a full year of unemployment, a large negative
earnings shock that has some strong covariates (especially employment in the construction
sector, Drewianka and Mercan 2009). We nevertheless exclude those observations because
in practice the estimates are quite sensitive to the way we treat them.
Unlike some other studies, we include observations from both the main sample and
from the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO), a special over-sample consisting of de-
scendents of low-income families from 1966 (see Hill 1992 for more details). The main
impetus for including SEO observations is that it more than quadruples the sample size
among non-whites, thereby allowing stronger inferences on racial differences. This is a
key question because evidence from the PSID Validation Study indicates that race is one of
the few strong covariates of measurement error in earnings (Duncan et al. 1985), suggest-
ing a plausible alternate explanation for previous findings that blacks experience greater
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earnings instability than whites. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) argue that there is little harm
in including the SEO sample in studies of earnings shocks because any differences in the
distributions of earnings between the SEO and main samples would be washed away when
the data are differenced as in equation (5), and Drewianka (2010) has shown that the dis-
tribution of reported earnings (as well as hours, hourly wages, age, and education) for the
SEO sample is very similar to the distribution among men of the same race in the main
sample; suggesting the SEO may be more representative than one might have expected.4
Nevertheless, all specifications include dummy variables for SEO status and the estimated
coefficients are rarely large or statistically significant.
Since our goal is to identify covariates of earnings risk, it is necessary to link variables
across survey waves. A given wave includes information about the respondents’ current
characteristics (e.g., their occupation or industry) and their earnings in the previous year,
but our analysis uses those characteristics to predict earnings shocks that will happen over
the following year, which are reported in the survey wave gathered two years hence.
While most of the literature examines log real annual earnings, we instead analyze log
real weekly wages (measured in 2007 dollars). We do this because we are most interested in
measuring permanent risk accurately, as it should have much greater behavioral relevance.
To see the point, note that
Var[log(earnings)] = Var
[
log
(
earnings
weeks worked
)]
+ Var[log(weeks)]+2Cov[log(earnings), log(weeks)]. (24)
We conjecture that variation in individuals’ log(weeks) is typically either (i) transitory or
(ii) planned by the individual, and if so most changes in log(weeks) would not represent
4The similarity between those race-specific distributions could possible reflect churning in the income
distribution or intergenerational mean reversion, but it also may arise simply because some men entered the
SEO sample through marriage, despite not having been eligible for it on their own.
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permanent risk. Moreover, previous work has found that its covariance with log(weekly
earnings) is quite modest (Haider 2001). We thus suspect that analyzing log(earnings/week)
will reduce the noise in our measures of permanent risk.
Other variables used included in the second stage regressions (8) and (9) are individu-
als’ degree of self-employment, educational status, and level of risk tolerance. We include
the first since one would expect workers who are (fully) self-employed to have more volatile
incomes. Although we ultimately removed students, results were robust to their inclusion.
Finally, since this is a study about risk, we included a measure of a person’s risk tolerance
that was asked during the 1996 wave of the PSID (plus a dummy variable for respondents
who did not appear in that wave). The variable was originally constructed by posing hypo-
thetical gambles to respondents regarding whether or not they would take a job that could
double their income, but had a variable probability of reducing their by some percentage.
See Kimball, Sahm, and Shapiro (2008, 2009) for further discussions.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics stratified by covariates. We have a total of 115,843
observations of annual earnings from 11,919 unique individuals, but since second- and
fourth-differences cannot be computed for some observations; we are ultimately able to
use about 4,300 individuals to analyzeγ and 5,000 for β . Most are white, though blacks are
overrepresented due to the inclusion of the SEO data. They work in a variety of industries
and occupations, and over ten percent of the observations represent workers who are at
least partially self-employed. Around ten percent were not working as of the interview.
1.5 Practical Implementation
1.5.1 First stage specification
Following much of the literature on earnings dynamics, we implement the population age-
earnings profile F as a fourth-order polynomial. We estimate it separately for each of 24
demographic groups–each combination of the man’s race (white or non-white), birth co-
hort (pre-baby boom: pre-1946, the first half of the baby boom: 1946-1955, the second
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half of the baby boom: 1956-1964, and post-baby boom: post-1964), and highest level of
education completed (less than high school, high school graduate, more than high school).
In each case we add individual fixed effects (discussed in the next paragraph), a dummy
variable for men from the SEO sample (though this parameter is almost always statistically
insignificant), a linear time trend, and random effects for each year to account for macroe-
conomic shocks that may vary across groups. (Since those random effects are also a form of
risk, we shall ultimately add them to the fitted values from our earnings risk regressions to
form our final estimate of an individuals’ earnings risk.) One might be concerned about not
including other covariates in the first stage specification (i.e., E
[
ui(t+k)−uit |Xit
] 6= 0), but
most are constant over time and would thus be redundant given the inclusion of individual
fixed effects.
Those individual fixed effects are our way of implementing the person-specific age-
earnings profile, Q. A specification with higher-order person-specific terms would fit the
individuals’ expected earnings more precisely, but that consideration must be weighed
against the substantial risk of over-fitting the model, especially for respondents with rel-
atively short reported earnings histories. Fortunately, conclusions about the covariates of
earnings risk are not very sensitive to the choice between specifications of Q. We experi-
mented with several more elaborate specifications, including person-specific growth rates
(using either fixed or normally-distributed random effects) and some higher-order terms,
but our estimates of the difference (ui(t+k)− uit) were quite highly correlated (ρ ≥ 0.98)
across the five separate specifications of Q we tried. Among other things, this is consistent
with Hryshko’s (2012) evidence against heterogeneity in individual’s deterministic earn-
ings growth rates. At any rate, since our estimators are constructed from such differences,
little is lost by using the simplest specification, and doing so leaves more degrees of free-
dom for the estimation of the group age-earnings profile F .
One might be concerned that the person-specific age-earnings profile (F +Q) will pro-
vide a closer fit to the actual earnings history of individuals who appear in the sample for
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a smaller number of years. However, note that apart from the fixed effect, the estimated
age-earnings profile will be identical for everyone within each of the 24 groups, and the
individual fixed effect just ensures that the mean residual u is zero for each person. More-
over, since we can only compute β (respectively γ) when we observe a person’s earnings
over a period of at least 9 (11) years, our analysis will not include data from any individuals
with especially short reported earnings histories.
1.5.2 Computation of permanent and temporary earnings risk
Once those residual differences (ui(t+k)−uit) are estimated, we can compute the statistics
we use to measure the risks: α , β , β ∗, γ , and φ . Because the PSID became biennial after
1997, we opted to work with even-numbered lags; specifically, we compute our statistics
using all even-numbered lags j and (where applicable) leads q between 4 and 16. Thus, for
a single person-year pair (uit and ui(t+k)) we can potentially compute 7 values of βitk j and
αitk j by varying j, while the ability to vary both j and q allows construction of up to 49
values of γitk jq and φitk jq. Since our goal is to measure risk over short widows of time, we
use k = 2 for γ and φ , and k = 4 for β and α; recall that we need k ≥ 3 for β and α , but
not for γ and φ .
1.5.3 Second stage procedure
Our final step involves regressing the α , β , β ∗, γ , and φ statistics computed in the previous
step on covariates X , as in equations (8) and (9) above. This step is of primary interest both
because it reveals the covariates most associated with the components of earnings risk and
because the fitted values (e.g., E [γ|X ]) are our best measure of the risks facing individuals
at a point in time.
One important complication is that for each method we have created multiple statis-
tics that represent each person-year’s earnings risk, but those measures are inherently het-
eroskedastic. This is especially problematic for the γ statistics: those that use longer leads
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and lags ( j and q) are noisier because they include more interactions between permanent
shocks inside the focal time period (between times t and t + k) and those outside of it. We
thus weight the observations by their estimated precision when we run regressions like (8)
and (9). The details of that procedure are described more fully in the Appendix.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Predictions of earnings risk
Table 1.2 lists selected centiles of the distributions of the computed statistics. In the first
panel, the first three columns reflect the raw β , β ∗, and γ while the next three columns
report centiles of the fitted values from regressions like (8), and the remaining columns
report fitted values from otherwise identical regressions that also include individual fixed
effects; the second panel reports analogous distributions for α and φ . For the measures of
permanent risk, roughly 40 percent of the raw statistics are less than zero, as are around 20
percent of the OLS fitted values for β . this is disconcerting because they are supposed to
estimated variances. There are many fewer negative fitted values for our preferred measures
γ (8 percent) and β ∗ (4 percent), however. There are slightly more negative FE fitted values
in most instances.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 present the same information graphically. The red lines are plots of
the indicated fitted value, with a 95 percent confidence band plotted as dotted blue lines on
either side for centiles 2 through 98. Not only are there fewer negative fitted values for γ and
β ∗than for β , but their confidence intervals are also tighter. For example, only one percent
of the γ̂OLS fitted values are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level,
suggesting the reassuring hypothesis that the negative estimates may result simply from
sampling error. Similar conclusions follow for the other statistics as well. The distributions
of the fitted values for our two measures of temporary risk (α and φ ) are fairly similar to
one another, though the confidence intervals are somewhat wider for φ .
Table 1.3 presents correlations between the various calculated and fitted values to help
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us assess whether the measures capture the same thing. In Panel A for permanent risk, we
find a very low correlation both between γ and β and also γ and β and their associated
fitted values. The correlation between β ∗and β and γ is better. Specifically, the correlation
between β ∗and γ , almost 0.4, compared to β and β ∗, about 0.14 only. However, this should
not be surprising given that β is likely contaminated by the presence of transitory risk; and
one would hope that the other two measures which attempt to correct for this would capture
some of the same thing. Similar qualitative patterns emerge for correlations between the
statistics and their predicted values. Fitted values for β ∗and γ are negatively correlated with
β . The situation improves in Panel B when looking at transitory risk. The correlations, both
between calculated φ and α; and φ and α and their corresponding fitted values are much
stronger. The fitted values of φ correlate well with α ′s fitted values. This is puzzling: γ
and β are not strongly correlated, but φ and α are, despite having been computed from γ
and β , respectively.
Because γ and φ are our preferred measures of risk, and because γ and β ∗ are similar,
the following section focuses mainly on γ and φ , unless otherwise specified, though we do
report estimates for β , β ∗, and α for comparability with previous work. Additionally, we
consider only the fitted values from the long OLS regressions since the means are closer,
much less dispersed, and fewer are negative than their FE counterparts.
1.6.2 Unconditional earnings risk
Before turning to specific results, some preliminary observations are worth noting. Table
1.4 presents average values of annual total earnings risk u2it and the five estimates for perma-
nent and transitory earnings risk stratified by various demographic, industrial, and occupa-
tional characteristics. Where comparable, Carroll and Samwick’s (1997, Table 1) estimates
of permanent and transitory risk are presented in the columns labeled “CS.” Again, the
analysis computes each γ and φ statistic using two-year differences (i.e., k = 2), for all
even-numbered values of j and q between 4 and 16, so we have many individual estimates
19
for each person-year.
It is encouraging that there are very few negative values reported for any of the statistics,
and many of those are close to zero (e.g., γ for electrical engineers). In most instances,
mean values for γ and (especially) β ∗ are smaller than the corresponding values for β .
Carroll and Samwick’s measure of permanent risk is usually higher than our γ , while their
measure of temporary risk is always lower; the same is true for Meghir and Pistaferri’s
(2004) estimates (not shown).
Now we turn to identifying factors that are correlated with earnings risk. Whites, those
in the main sample (not the SEO), and self-employed people experience higher permanent
risk that most of their competing categories. Permanent risk appears to follow a U-shaped
pattern over the life-cycle. Like Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we find that high school
graduates are less exposed to permanent earnings shocks than either dropouts or (espe-
cially) college graduates. In addition, those related to construction and farming do not
seem to have above average exposure to permanent risk. Finally, it is reassuring that per-
sons with higher reported risk tolerance appear to experience greater risk of permanent
earnings shocks.
In contrast, transitory risk appears to be experienced more uniformly across the SEO
designation and level of education. However, fully self-employed individuals and blacks
face a substantially larger exposure to risk. Workers in the agriculture- and construction-
related sectors have some of the highest reported values, as do those in legal services;
this suggests that the majority of workers in these sectors are exposed to risks which are
temporary in nature, and this appears to be the case for most categories Individuals not
working at time of survey have some of the highest values of transitory earnings risk.
No clear pattern emerges over the life-cycle, though perhaps the second half of workers’
careers is defined by greater risk, as are more recent cohorts. The same could be said re-
garding risk tolerance, except that the very highest levels are associated with large increases
in risk. Men who are single or widowed have the highest raw exposure to permanent risk
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and the divorced, separated, and widowed the highest exposure to raw temporary risk.
One potential explanation for this lack of significance is collinearity between covariates.
We have thus run “shorter” regressions (results not reported) that only included one variable
or category of variables (i.e., just occupation or just partially and fully self-employed) in
addition to the year effects. While there is an increase in significance for some variables,
these stripped down regressions largely confirm the results of their “longer” counterparts.
For permanent risk, African and Asian Americans face lower risk compared to whites,
and now both high school dropouts and those in the SEO sample face decreased exposure.
The degree of risk tolerance was not included in the long regressions since it was only
part of the 1996 PSID wave and therefore not available for all individuals. Given the
significance of the other variables, it is likely that its inclusion would have changed little.
However, in the shorter regressions, we found that those with the highest levels of risk
tolerance face higher permanent risk than those with the lowest level, with coefficients
increasing in risk tolerance. There emerged decreased risk for those aged 36-45 relative to
26-30 year olds and increased exposure for singles relative to married persons.
When examining the short regressions for transitory risk, almost all racial groups face
less risk than whites, except for African Americans. With regard to the life-cycle, the
short regressions indicate that compared to the youngest workers, older workers are subject
to lower temporary risk; while none of these coefficients are significant, the significance
increases as workers age, coming close to marginal (i.e., 10 percent level) significance for
the oldest workers. Lastly, the degree of risk tolerance is not significant and there is no clear
qualitative pattern, though the divorced face less temporary risk than married persons.
1.6.3 Covariates of earnings risk
The mean values of permanent and temporary earnings risk given in Table 1.4 provide
preliminary evidence that the estimates will vary meaningfully across groups. However,
they do not necessarily provide a good sense of which factors have the strongest influence
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in constructing our estimates of earnings risk because many of the proposed covariates are
correlated with one another. In other words, we wish to determine which differences in the
raw means are statistically significant. To investigate this point further, Table 1.5 presents
estimates from regressions of the statistics on a number of variables one may use to predict
an individual’s permanent and transitory earnings risks. We focus on the regressions which
generated the OLS fitted values for γ and φ .5
When one examines Table 1.5, several interesting and perhaps surprising points emerge.
First, very few covariates are significant predictors of either type of risk, though temporary
risk has a few more strong predictors. Examining permanent risk we find that high school
graduates face less risk than those with more than a high school degree. A few occupa-
tions have relatively less permanent risk: those in transportation, engineering, architecture,
mathematics, and medicine. A surprising result may be that workers who are partially
self-employed face statistically significantly less permanent risk compared to those work-
ing only for someone else, yet in 1.6.2, they had the highest level of permanent risk by
self-employment status.
Considering transitory risk more closely, we again do not see much significance within
the long regressions either. Both groups which have some degree of self-employment have
higher temporary risk relative to not being self-employed to any degree. It is worth noting
that those thought to face larger or more temporary earnings shocks—those in the con-
struction and agricultural industries or not working at the time of the survey—do not face a
significantly larger increase, though in some cases, the sign is positive. Hispanics face less
transitory risk compared to whites.
It may therefore be tempting to conclude that none of the variables selected predict any
of the statistics very well. However, the magnitude of the point estimates (and the signs in
some cases) suggests a more substantial relationship, in addition to potential collinearity
among the demographic and employment variables. Arguably more relevant are the fitted
5The results from the FE regressions indicate that the estimates from the two different specifications are
not particularly sensitive to within-group heterogeneity.
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values, which we discussed earlier.
Given this paper’s motivation, another noteworthy finding is that the predicted values
vary not only across workers, but within workers’ careers. A simple variance decomposi-
tion of the fitted values reveals that within-individual fluctuations account for about 50-65
percent of variation in the statistics.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
We have modified, implemented, and compared two methods for measuring individuals’
earnings risk. Results from both of our methods attribute less variation than some previous
work to permanent shocks, although this still corresponds to a standard deviation of per-
manent risk on the order of 10 percent per year. Although most earnings risk is evidently
transitory in nature (or possibly an indication of measurement error), permanent risks do
vary notably across educational and racial groups.
Unlike their predecessors in the literature, both of the methods we propose not only
distinguish between risks of permanent and temporary earnings shocks, but also produce
estimates that vary across workers and within their individual earnings histories, a feature
that should make them particularly useful for studies that aim to measure the effect of risk
on behavior. For example, one might use such measures to assess the extent to which earn-
ings risk affects individuals’ ex ante choices about investments in human capital, marriage
and fertility, or homeownership, or perhaps their risk of costly outcomes like divorce or
bankruptcy.
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Centile β β * γ β OLS β * OLS γ OLS β FE β 
* 
FE γ FE
0 -31.61 -4.84 -10.62 -0.13 -0.05 -0.57 -0.48 -0.08 -0.55
4 -0.17 -0.10 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02
8 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01
10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
16 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
24 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
28 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
30 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
32 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
56 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02
60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02
64 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02
68 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02
70 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02
72 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02
76 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02
80 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02
84 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02
88 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03
90 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.03
92 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.03
96 0.31 0.16 0.23 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.04
100 31.48 4.45 10.72 0.39 0.12 0.30 0.71 0.11 0.71
Table 1.2A: Distributions of Computed and Fitted Values for Permanent Earnings Risk
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Centile α OLS φ OLS α FE φ FE
0 -0.24 -0.35 -0.76 -0.93
4 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
8 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00
12 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
16 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
20 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03
24 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
28 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04
30 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05
32 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05
36 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.06
40 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07
44 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.08
48 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09
50 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09
52 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.10
56 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11
60 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.12
64 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.14
68 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.15
70 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.15
72 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.16
76 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.18
80 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.19
84 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.21
88 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.23
90 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.24
92 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.25
96 0.34 0.29 0.37 0.30
100 0.80 1.51 0.83 1.62
Table 1.2B: Distributions of Computed and Fitted 
Values for Temporary Earnings Risk
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Figure 1.2A. Fitted Values of Component Estimators of Permanent Earnings Risk, OLS
(centiles 2 trhough 98 shown)
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Figure 1.2B. Fitted Values of Component Estimators of Permanent Earnings Risk, FE
(centiles 2 trhough 98 shown)
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Figure 1.3A. Fitted Values of Component Estimators of Temporary Earnings Risk, OLS
(centiles 2 trhough 98 shown)
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Figure 1.3B. Fitted Values of Component Estimators of Temporary Earnings Risk, FE
(centiles 2 trhough 98 shown)
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Variable Est. S.E. P-val. Est. S.E. P-val.
Race (vs. White)
1.57 1.04 0.13 0.57 1.31 0.67
-0.17 1.38 0.90 -1.51 1.31 0.25
-2.67 2.65 0.31 -2.04 2.13 0.34
2.33 6.86 0.73 -3.52 1.60 0.03
    Black
    Native American     
Asian     Hispanic     
Other
0.32 2.52 0.90 -3.17 2.22 0.15
Age  (vs. 26-30)
0.40 3.00 0.90 0.45 1.95 0.82
-3.76 4.57 0.41 -6.39 7.96 0.42
-5.01 6.41 0.43 -7.61 9.69 0.43
-5.70 7.08 0.42 -9.25 10.17 0.36
-7.20 7.45 0.33 -8.48 10.18 0.41
-6.61 7.82 0.40 -8.61 9.99 0.39
    21-25     
31-35     
36-40     
41-45     
46-50     
51-55     
56-60 -5.15 7.98 0.52 -9.70 10.21 0.34
Education (vs. More than HS)
    Less than HS 1.03 1.24 0.41 0.67 1.32 0.61
0.36 1.23 0.77 0.57 1.88 0.76    HS grad
PSID Sample (vs. Main)
0.94 0.92 0.30 0.29 1.47 0.84    SEO
Self-Employment  (vs. Not at 
all)    Partially 10.23 2.72 0.00 6.24 2.71 0.02
20.29 2.97 0.00 21.28 5.51 0.00    Fully
Birth Cohort (vs. 1951-1955)
    pre-1930 1.89 5.98 0.75 5.49 9.49 0.56
    1931-1940 1.78 5.10 0.73 5.94 9.19 0.52
    1941-1945 2.21 5.28 0.68 6.29 9.57 0.51
    1946-1950 -0.02 2.00 0.99 2.73 3.41 0.42
    1956-1960 -5.12 2.07 0.01 -2.79 1.96 0.15
    1961-1964 -10.67 3.66 0.00 -3.94 5.14 0.44
    1965-1969 -7.42 5.75 0.20 -9.43 6.85 0.17
    post-1970 -0.46 10.29 0.96 -7.95 9.90 0.42
Table 1.5B: Estimated Effects of Covariates on the Variance of Temporary Earnings Shocks 
(OLS), x100
α φ
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Variable Est. S.E. P-val. Est. S.E. P-val.
Industry  (vs. Retail)
-2.18 4.38 0.62 6.01 5.25 0.25
-8.17 2.77 0.00 -1.60 3.65 0.66
-1.64 2.58 0.53 0.75 4.02 0.85
-5.96 2.55 0.02 -3.59 3.81 0.35
0.95 5.69 0.87 9.90 8.07 0.22
-5.40 2.00 0.01 0.85 2.99 0.78
-4.45 2.37 0.06 2.64 4.23 0.53
-4.74 2.60 0.07 2.46 4.96 0.62
-4.35 2.46 0.08 -1.00 4.07 0.81
-2.59 2.99 0.39 5.58 4.72 0.24
-6.71 3.68 0.07 -3.17 3.64 0.38
-5.25 5.90 0.37 1.96 12.74 0.88
-4.09 2.56 0.11 -2.05 3.69 0.58
-5.43 2.48 0.03 -2.33 3.67 0.53
-5.73 2.17 0.01 10.19 13.21 0.44
1.72 3.42 0.62 4.50 6.76 0.51
-5.31 2.10 0.01 1.59 3.65 0.66
-6.08 2.42 0.01 -5.71 4.11 0.16
-8.40 2.61 0.00 -1.97 3.94 0.62
    Uncategorized/Missing 
Not working at interview     
Other Services
    Constr. Relate.
    Public Administration     
Mechanical Eng.     Other 
Trans.     Wholesale
    Wood/Paper/Print 
Educ./Sport
    Health Service     
Agriculture, forestry 
Electrical Eng.
    Postal System
    Energy/Water 
Construction
    Iron/Steel
    Food Industry 
Clothing/Text.
    Legal Services
4.57 6.61 0.49 3.74 7.37 0.61
Occupation  (vs. Priv. Bus. Leadr.)
20.40 6.97 0.00 0.37 5.71 0.95
31.04 6.26 0.00 14.15 3.52 0.00
5.07 2.11 0.02 1.98 3.43 0.56
2.33 1.83 0.20 7.11 3.78 0.06
2.77 2.21 0.21 2.14 3.32 0.52
2.17 2.72 0.43 -4.63 3.70 0.21
0.93 1.98 0.64 -0.42 2.46 0.86
1.00 2.46 0.69 -0.43 4.06 0.92
    Uncategorized/Missing 
Not working at interview     
Transport. Oper.     
Machine Fitter
    Labor./Craftsmn.     
Bricklay./Carpt.     Convey. 
Oper.
    Vendor
    Architect/Engineer -0.12 1.56 0.94 -3.25 3.12 0.30
φα
(continued on next page)
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Variable Est. S.E. P-val. Est. S.E. P-val.
Occupation  (vs. Priv. Bus. Leadr.)
-0.63 2.72 0.82 0.31 1.59 0.85
0.62 5.29 0.91 2.72 5.39 0.61
-8.90 6.53 0.17 -0.97 5.76 0.87
1.25 6.85 0.86 1.04 2.91 0.72
4.95 5.23 0.34 5.09 2.70 0.06
-3.55 3.59 0.32 2.39 2.25 0.29
0.55 2.80 0.84 -2.69 1.68 0.11
1.78 5.43 0.74 -0.51 3.13 0.87
-7.38 6.92 0.29 -4.42 5.38 0.41
21.20 16.47 0.20 7.80 7.63 0.31
1.18 2.27 0.60 2.62 2.60 0.31
53.05 33.65 0.12 15.75 10.77 0.14
-0.01 2.88 1.00 0.99 3.20 0.76
-3.20 2.20 0.15 -2.09 3.46 0.55
-8.28 5.68 0.15 0.52 4.54 0.91
    Inspector
    Electr. Enginr. 
Security Servic.     
Educator
    Pipe Fitter
    Ofc. Worker etc. 
Mathematician 
Janitor
    Soldier
    Farm Manager 
Mailman
    Cook/Waiter 
Related Medical Job     
Business Managr.     
Insurance Rep.     Eng. 
Tech. Expert -2.59 3.09 0.40 -1.78 1.82 0.33
Marital Status  (vs. Married)
    Single 1.10 2.43 0.65 4.14 2.43 0.09
    Divorced -4.44 2.83 0.12 -1.04 2.84 0.71
    Separated 5.36 3.23 0.10 3.26 2.35 0.17
    Widowed 4.89 4.58 0.29 11.13 6.95 0.11
    Not available -17.50 7.18 0.02 -30.74 14.59 0.04
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
11.12 128.39 8.58 86.39
11.17 11.24 8.47 10.86
Calculated
Fitted Value (OLS) 
Fitted Value (FE) 12.24 12.89 10.49 11.60
Notes: All regressions include year effects. The bottom panel presents the statistics used as the 
dependent variable in the regressions, along with their generated fitted values.
φ
Table 1.5B: Estimated Effects of Covariates on the Variance of Temporary Earnings Shocks 
(OLS), X100
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2 The Influence of Earnings Risk on Mortgage Terms and
Performance
2.1 Introduction
While there seems to be general agreement that excessive risk-taking in the residential real
estate market was an important factor underlying the most recent recession in the U.S.,
there are several competing hypotheses about the cause of that excessive risk-taking. The
simplest possibility is that no one fully appreciated the risks that were being taken, but
most observers instead suggest some sort of informational asymmetry. For example, it is
often alleged that borrowers had some awareness of the risks they faced, but still applied
for loans because they recognized the implicit insurance provided by bankruptcy laws.
Other observers suggest that lenders may have originated mortgages that they should have
considered excessively risky because they could collect origination fees and quickly sell
the mortgage to an unsuspecting secondary market. Still another view is that regulations
like the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) created incentives for lenders to make some
loans that would ordinarily have been considered too risky. Unfortunately, it is challenging
to distinguish between these hypotheses because we do not directly observe what risks were
known to each agent.
This paper seeks to shed some light on the issue by investigating whether a series of
choices and responses made by agents were correlated with a measure of the risks facing
individual borrowers. It implements this strategy using the Panel Study on Income Dynam-
ics (PSID), one of the few large data sets that has longitudinal data on both a wide range
of individuals’ characteristics and information about the status of their mortgages. The
longitudinal aspect is particularly important because it allows investigation of potential re-
lationships between information that was available at the time the mortgage was originated
and the subsequent performance of those mortgages.
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The investigation begins by creating the measure of individuals’ risk, focusing on the
risk of shocks to one’s earnings from labor. While this is not the only risk that individuals
face, it is presumably one of the most important and least insurable, and the data indicate
that this risk varies considerably across individuals. The paper measures risk using the
method of Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), which has the advantage of allowing separate
estimates for the risks of permanent and temporary shocks. Two of the paper’s first results
demonstrate (i) that this measure varies considerably across individuals, and (ii) that labor
earnings risk, as computed at the time the mortgage was originated, is a strong predictor of
subsequent delinquency.
The paper then investigates the information structure by assessing whether agents’
choices actually vary with those risks. Specifically, I investigate the relationship between
this measure of labor earnings risk at the time a mortgage was originated and subsequent
outcomes and decisions made by borrowers and lenders. Intuitively, the idea is that the
relationships between borrowers’ or lenders’ decisions and earnings risk indicate they are
able to forecast (explicitly or implicitly) and respond to earnings risk. Furthermore, there
is some indication of moral hazard if the choices become more closely related to earnings
risk in contexts where recognizing the relationships lead to more favorable outcomes for
the decision-makers.
The paper then investigates the information structure by asking whether this measure
of risk predicts several outcomes. In the case of borrowers, the test is relatively straightfor-
ward. The PSID asks respondents a series of questions about their perception of their own
financial risk. As one might expect, the estimate of borrowers’ labor earnings risk is a sig-
nificant predictor of their responses to those questions. For example, borrowers with high
levels of estimated risk are much more likely to admit difficulty managing their household
budgets and to express a fear of falling behind on mortgage payments. Clearly this suggests
that borrowers have at least some indication of the risks they face.6
6This finding is complimented by Mian and Sufi (2015) and Jiang et al. (2014a) who document the
relationship between worse mortgage performance and income misstatement by borrowers.
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The results are somewhat more complex in the case of lenders. The paper first shows
that there is no relationship between borrowers’ estimated risk and the terms of their mort-
gages (e.g., the interest rate). This may not seem surprising, as lenders generally offer the
same terms to all borrowers who qualify for a particular class of mortgage, but this rea-
soning is misleading because heterogeneity in lenders’ standards should nonetheless create
an equilibrium in which high-risk borrowers pay higher interest rates (for example, lenders
who offer more favorable loan terms should attract more applicants and thus can be more
selective, and conversely, those who are less selective can only remain profitable if they
charge higher rates. Presumably borrowers prefer lenders who offer more favorable terms
but would turn to other lenders if they anticipated their applications would be rejected).
Thus, the fact that high-risk borrowers do not pay systematically higher interest rates than
low-risk borrowers might seem to suggest that lenders are uninformed about borrowers’
risk.
However, this pattern is also consistent with the claim that mortgage originators may
overlook borrowers’ risk if they can dump the loan onto the secondary market. This view
is also supported by another finding: lenders respond differently to delinquent mortgages
depending on the borrowers’ risk, and they even seem capable of distinguishing between
risks of temporary and permanent shocks. At a minimum this suggests that lenders have
some capability of assessing borrowers’ risk, at least in certain situations. Moreover, note
that those situations in which lenders appear to respond to borrowers’ risk occur at a stage
in which lenders stand to make higher profits by judging risk levels well, whereas there
are some reasons (i.e., resale) to think that lenders’ profits would have suffered if they
had reacted to borrowers’ estimated risk. The fact that their choices become more closely
related to earnings risk in contexts where recognizing the relationships lead to more favor-
able outcomes for the decision-makers arguably provides additional evidence suggesting
that lenders are reasonably well-informed about borrowers’ risks.
The evidence is less favorable for the hypothesis that reforms like the CRA played an
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important role. Intuitively, if such regulations provided incentives for lenders to approve
loans that would otherwise be deemed too risky, we should expect to find a stronger re-
lationship between risk and loan terms in markets where such regulations affected fewer
borrowers. The data are not consistent with this prediction, however.
While it should be clear already that this exercise can provide only circumstantial ev-
idence, some additional limitations should be acknowledged up front. To begin with, the
statistic used in this paper is merely an estimate of individuals’ risk, so it obviously mea-
sures their actual risk with error. Even so, the fact that it proves to be a strong predictor
of delinquency suggests that it captures a key part of the desired variation. Furthermore,
note that measurement error would tend to bias the conclusions away from what the pa-
per ultimately finds: it would obscure a true relationship between risk and behavior, yet
in spite of that bias the evidence still provides some indication both borrowers and lenders
had some awareness of variation in borrowers’ risk. It needs to be emphasized (and cannot
be overemphasized) at the outset that the approach taken here is not about critiquing and
attempting to improve lenders’ credit risk models, but rather performing an empirical exer-
cise that can provide insights into the nature of the recent crisis at a micro level. Because
of the importance of this concern, it will be further addressed at length in the next section.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Institutional considerations
Although earnings risk is just one type of risk facing borrowers that can affect their prob-
ability of delinquency, it is presumably one of the most important risks they face. Labor
income accounts for the vast majority of most households’ total incomes and it is much
more difficult to insure against shocks to labor income than against shocks to most other
types of income. All of this suggests that borrowers’ demand for mortgages should be sen-
sitive to their earnings risk. In section 4 I will show that my measure of earnings risk does
in fact predict borrowers’ likelihood of delinquency, as well as indicate that they appreciate
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this relationship.
Some readers may object to the proceeding analysis of lenders on the grounds that that
it would be illegal to act on some of the information available to the econometrician, such
as the borrower’s race. First, there is of course no guarantee that lenders actually follow
the law. Nonetheless, a more complete response to this point is that statistical relationships
need not reflect causality: even if we were to find that borrowers’ race predicted lenders’
decisions, that would not necessarily imply any discriminatory intent because we could
not immediately rule out the possibility that the statistical relationship actually reflected a
legitimate response to a permissible factor—such as credit scores—that was unobserved by
the econometrician and was correlated with race. Because this paper can only demonstrate
broad statistical relationships, the findings provided below are not evidence that any single
borrower or lender did anything inappropriate or illegal.
This observation extends into a response to the more general critique that the informa-
tion possessed by lenders differs from that available to the econometrician. For example,
lenders presumably know borrowers’ credit scores (which is not reported in the PSID), but
not their earnings history (which is), so the measure of earnings risk used in this paper
would surely differ from that used by lenders—if they used one at all.
Further, the idea that earnings risk is related to lenders’ decisions and if they price this
into mortgages is likely more controversial. One possible objection is that lenders typically
make loans to all successful applicants at some fixed interest rate, so earnings risk would
only affect mortgage lending at the extensive margin. But this reasoning is incomplete
because differences in lenders’ standards should still lead to an equilibrium in which riskier
borrowers obtain mortgages at higher interest rates: borrowers who are rejected as too risky
by some lenders could still be able to get a mortgage from other lenders who charge higher
interest rates.7
7Some readers may find it helpful to note that this point is similar to the common classroom example
where heterogeneous reservation wages create an elastic aggregate labor supply curve even when individual
workers supply labor inelastically at the intensive margin.
53
A more fundamental objection is that it is unreasonable to expect lenders to respond
to earnings risk since they do not observe it well. For example, while the Uniform Resi-
dential Loan Application (URLA)8 provides lenders with information on the loan-to-value
(LTV) of the mortgage and borrowers’ debt-to-income ratios (DTI), it contains limited in-
formation on borrowers’ employment and earnings—in most cases, just the identity of the
employer, their current monthly income, tenure at their first and most recent job, and their
self-employment status.9 Nevertheless, even though this list does not include an explicit
measure of borrowers’ earnings risk, lenders may still consider earnings risk implicitly
if the models they use to make lending decisions assign weights to the available factors in
rough proportion to their contribution to a prediction of earnings risk. Note that even a very
simplistic statistical model designed to predict the expected profitability of a loan would
tend to capture earnings risk insofar as it were an important determinant of profitability,
so it may not be too far-fetched to believe that lenders may act as i f 10 they were taking
earnings risk into consideration even if they do not observe it directly.
Similar reasoning also suggests that it is not prohibitive that the available variables dif-
fer considerably from the information listed in a URLA.11 While this deficiency precludes
the assessment of lenders’ compliance with regulation, it does not necessarily prevent the
investigation of the more basic question of whether lenders act as if they were consider-
ing earnings risk. One very important factor that determines borrowers’ ability to finance a
mortgage (and that can be measured) is the uncertainty in their earnings. Another important
issue is if my measure of borrowers’ earnings risk is an effective proxy for their actual risk,
since measurement error would tend to bias estimates toward the conclusion that lenders
are uninformed. However, in spite of that potential bias, it will be shown that there is an
8Freddie Mac Form 65 or Fannie Mae Form 1003. https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide_form/1003rev.pdf
9See sections 4 and 5 of the URLA. The URLA does not provide a detailed earnings history. The form
does require additional employment and earnings information only if certain cases, such as if the borrower’s
current tenure is less than two years or if they are self-employed.
10Recall Milton Friedman’s example of of using formulas from geometry and physics to predict a pool
player’s shots.
11The PSID contains much more detailed information than the URLA about borrowers’ employment con-
ditions and their earnings history, but it does not include important factors like their credit scores.
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indication of a response to risk. Therefore, I can cast doubt on the idea that information
about borrowers’ earnings risk (and their risk of delinquency) is completely one-sided.
2.2.2 Theoretical expectations
This study is certainly not the first work to attempt to analyze the potential causes and their
contribution to the recent dysfunction of the mortgage market. In addition to borrower
income misstatement already mentioned, a very brief list other studies have shown roles
for securitization (Levitin and Wachter 2012), other misreporting (Griffin and Maturana
2014), the secondary market (Jiang et al. 2014b), the political economy of housing and
lending policies (Mian et al. 2013), the supply side of the mortgage market (Mian and
Sufi 2009; Justiniano et al. 2015), and household leverage (Mian and Sufi 2010 and 2011).
Given the empirical approach taken here and the subsequent findings, I now focus on work
that is the most immediately relevant.
Without information problems, risk should be accurately priced into the terms of the
mortgage, especially given the relatively recent switch to risk-based pricing in consumer
lending (Einav et al. 2013). For instance, interest rates should be increasing in borrowers’
risk and decreasing in their credit score (Edelberg 2006). One could still expect mortgage
performance to be correlated with earnings instability arising from “trigger events” such
as job loss (Avery et al. 1996). If a borrower’s risk were clear to everyone involved, we
would expect riskier borrowers to pay higher interest rates. This would be a clear prediction
under the risk-based pricing that has become more common in recent years (Einav et al.
2013), but it would also be true even if lenders charged a fixed interest rate and the riskiest
borrowers were more likely to be denied credit (Chatterjee et al. 2011). Even in this case,
rejected applicants could subsequently apply to lenders charging higher interest rates who
might still find it profitable to lend to someone deemed too risky by lenders who charge
lower interest rates.
Since these predictions are inconsistent with the evidence presented below, it is likely
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that the market suffers from some sort of informational problem. Past work has shown that
information problems can result in the deterioration of mortgage quality and that lenders
are able to perceive this problem (Demyankyk and Hemert 2011). Also, lenders may be
willing to grant and price mortgages this way because they do not bear the full risk of
default. For example, lenders may originate mortgages and immediately sell them into the
secondary market, finding willing buyers since the terms do not reflect the underlying risk.
This way they get the profit from originating the mortgage and are free of any losses should
the mortgage go sour. Another possibility is that lenders are insulated from losses because
mortgages which they hold onto are insured by the government. This would be true of
FHA-insured or other government-backed loans that would shield lenders from downside
risk.
Alternatively, borrowers may have better information about their risk then lenders. If
borrowers can hide this information from lenders, mortgage terms and delinquency rates
would not correspond well (e.g., high risk borrowers would get “cheap” mortgages). Bor-
rowers’ option to default would protect them from a portion of the downside risk. Some
work has shown borrowers self-select into mortgages with certain features, especially the
interest rate type (i.e., fixed versus adjustable interest rates) based on their risk profiles (Liu
and Sing 2013).
One final consideration has to do with homeownership policies and their potential un-
intended consequences. One such policy that came under fire in the early days of the
Financial Crisis was the Community Reinvestment Act. This law which required lenders
to meet the demand for credit in their locales, including lower income neighborhoods, and
it developed means of evaluating lenders’ success in meeting those credit needs. However,
critics have argued that such rules incent lenders to grant subprime loans to borrowers who
would not otherwise be deemed good credit risks (Agarwal et al. 2012).
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2.3 Data Description & Earnings Risk Measures
2.3.1 Sample
Mortgage data Data on loan terms and characteristics come from the 2001-2011 waves
of the PSID. This is because the focus is on the period during the housing bubble and its
bursting, and also because before 2001, information is either less detailed or non-existent.
Information on loan terms is provided by asking the borrower, not the lender. They include
the interest rate level (measured in basis points) and its type (fixed or variable); the amount
of principal left; the monthly payment;12 the number of years left to pay; the house value,13
which is noisy because it is determined by simply asking the respondent what they would
get for their home if they sold it today; the year the mortgage was originated; and the
number of years remaining on the mortgage. Also included are borrowers’ DTI where debts
include credit card debt, student loans, medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives;14
and net wealth (which can be negative) where the debts are the same as listed and assets
include IRAs, stocks, annuities; checking and savings accounts; CDs and other bonds; life
insurance; and employer pension.
Mortgage performance variables come from the supplemental files on Housing, Mort-
gage Distress, and Wealth for 2009 and 2011. These include indicators for whether a person
is behind on payments (i.e., delinquency); the number of months behind on payments; if
the lender has begun the foreclosure process; as well as whether the mortgage has been
refinanced and if mortgage debt has been restructured, though again, no details are pro-
vided as to the type of refinancing or how the mortgage debt was restructured. The data
set also includes a somewhat novel variable for borrowers’ self-reported perceptions about
the likelihood that they will fall behind on their mortgage payments by asking them if it is
12For about 35-40 percent of mortgages, this includes property taxes and insurance, but there is no way to
net these contributions out.
13This variable is then used to compute home equity and the LTV. However, auto loans are offset by a
durable and fairly liquid asset of comparable value.
14This does not include debt from auto loans because the current principal remaining is unavailable. While
some variables may allow this to be backed out, this would create a very noisy measure.
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highly likely nor not likely at all that they will fall behind on payments.15
I should also note some unfortunate limitations. First, data are only available for those
who obtained mortgage financing. I have no information on mortgage rejection. Further, I
do not know who originated the loan nor who currently holds it; nor whether foreclosures
have been completed; whether or when a loan was paid off; what type of refinancing or
restructuring took place (e.g., was it a cash-out refinance or was it modified though the
federal government’s Home Affordable Modification Program); or how the debt was re-
structured. It is also unknown whether the mortgage is full- or no-doc, conventional or
government-insured, nor is there lien information or the amount of downpayment made.
Also, I do not have credit scores.16 Finally, most outcomes of interest are relatively recent
additions to the PSID (e.g., the 2009 and 2011 surveys), so the number of observations
for these variables is limited. Therefore, delinquency, foreclosure, etc. cannot be analyzed
during the time before the financial crisis.
I am only interested in individuals who have a home mortgage, particularly those for
whom I have mortgage and wealth information at origination, so the sample used for most
of the analysis will be somewhat smaller. In other words, some people have entered the
data after they obtained a mortgage, there is no information on them in the year of mort-
gage origination. There remain 5,442 people who have a mortgage, for a total of 14,944
person-year observations. Table 2.1 provides a summary of these mortgage variables and
the age-earnings and risk profiles of the people who have a mortgage. Thus in what follows,
mortgages originated during the time period 2001-2011 that are still in the sample during
2009-2011 will be analyzed.
Table 2.1A shows that there are just over 250 borrowers who fall behind and just over
15Available only for 2011, the PSID also asks whether if they feel (“yes” or “no”) they have difficulty
managing their personal finances, though not many people who are delinquent on mortgages, require restruc-
turing, etc. admit to having problems handling their money.
16Although this important piece of information is missing, it can be argued that it strengthens the findings
since I find an effect of earnings risk on delinquency despite the usual assumption that the econometrician
likely has less information than either borrowers or lenders.
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50 who have had foreclosure started: a greater number for both would be desirable.17 The
level of the interest rate and the high percentage of borrowers who have a fixed-rate mort-
gage suggests that most of the borrowers in the sample are at least near-prime or better.
Table 2.1B indicates that most distressed mortgages correspond to borrowers which lower
earnings and wealth, negative shocks, along with greater risk, DTI, and interest rates. The
number of distressed mortgages increases as one moves closer to the peak of the bubble
and then declines thereafter. These facts are reassuring since they fall in line with intu-
ition. Also interesting is how actual delinquency (Behind on Payments) and anticipated
delinquency (Prob. of Falling Behind) match up in many respects.
Earnings risk data The PSID is also used to obtain the earnings histories and income
shocks of individuals, as well as the measures of risk. Where possible, I used the version
recoded for use by the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF)—this being for all but the
2011 wave and supplementary variables. The data are yearly through 1997, after which
surveys are biennial. To be included in the sample, an individual must be a male, aged 16
to 65, working at least 52 hours per year, report positive earnings, and not be disabled. I
also include people from the Survey of Economic Opportunity which increases the propor-
tion of low income and minority respondents (Hill 1992). Given that some of the blame of
the crisis was put on policies targeting these groups, their addition is advantageous. The
earnings variable is the natural logarithm of real (in constant 2011 dollars) yearly earn-
ings.18 A wave of data records worker characteristics at the time of survey, but earnings are
retrospective, so current worker traits are matched with the income about to be earned in
the coming year. While the analysis of mortgages will only use data from the last decade
of this time series, the calculation of earnings risk is based on individuals’ earnings his-
17The same is true for the number of borrowers who admit to having trouble managing their personal
finances.
18Drewianka & Oberg (2014) examine the natural logarithm of the real weekly wage, the present paper
analyzes the broader risk of all annual income because it should be more relevant to lenders and borrowers.
They also experimented with other more complex specifications, including higher-order random effects, but
found little improvement.
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tories over 1970-2011 in order to get better estimates of individuals’ predicted earnings,
realized shocks, and risk. This sample begins with a total of 131,049 person-years made up
of 16,971 unique individuals.
2.3.2 Summary of empirical procedure for estimating individuals’ earnings risk
With earnings risk (or instability), we are interested in looking at how individuals’ earnings
deviate from their expected path, as defined by an age-earnings profile (equation 25).
yit = F(Ait ;θ)+µi+λt +λs+uit , (25)
where, yit , is i′s earnings in year t, F(Ait ;θ), a quartic in age, Ait , that varies across groups
defined by birth cohort, age group, and race; µi, a person-specific intercept; and uit is a
deviation (i.e., shock) to earnings; year, λt , and state, λs, fixed effects are also included.19
Fitted values of earnings, E(yit), are interpreted as the expected earnings path of the bor-
rowers, and the residuals are interpreted as the realized earnings shocks—deviations from
the expected earnings path.
For an approximation of earnings risk, I regress the squared residuals, u2it , on a set of
employment and demographic controls to obtain the fitted value, σˆ2uit = E[u
2
it |X ]. This use
of the fitted values can be interpreted as instrumenting in order to reduce measurement er-
ror (Carroll and Samwick, 1997). The variables in X used to obtain the fitted values are the
highest level of education completed, interacted with the year and a quartic in age; occupa-
tion and 2-digit-level industry; student status; degree of self-employment; birth group; race
and SEO status; and state.
19The setup here and the specification in subsection 3.2 give rise to what is known as a Restricted Income
Profile. Another choice would be a Heterogeneous Income Profile which allows for an individual-specific
growth rate in income. However, Hryshko (2012) finds that the Restricted Income Profile is the correct
specification when using the PSID.
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2.3.3 Decomposing individuals’ earnings risk
For the purposes here it is useful to decompose uit into permanent and temporary compo-
nents. An advantage of this is to see if borrowers and lenders act as if they make such
a distinction between permanent and temporary risks. Shocks that take a long time to
dissipate are likely of greater consequence to both borrowers and lenders. For instance,
borrowers who face higher permanent risk can be blocked from credit markets because
they may have greater difficulty in servicing their debt; or in the event they obtain it, they
may pay premiums through higher interest rates. Borrowers who miss payments due to
increased exposure to temporary risk may be less likely to be foreclosed upon and receive
relief through debt restructuring since these income shortfalls are just that: short.20
The most standard model of the earnings process decomposes uit (equation 26), the
observed earnings shock, into a permanent component, piit , where ηit is the permanent
shock (equation 27); and a temporary shock, vit .
uit = piit + vit , (26)
piit = pii(t−1)+ηit . (27)
Permanent and temporary earnings risk are represented by the variances σ2η and σ2v of
the permanent and temporary shocks η and v, respectively. The shocks are mean-zero and
are assumed to be uncorrelated with one another. Permanent shocks are also assumed to
be uncorrelated with one another, E(ηitηit ′) = 0 for all t and t ′. The temporary shocks are
assumed to satisfy covariance restrictions consistent with empirical findings, specifically,
E(vitvi′t ′) = 0 for |t− t ′| ≥ 3 (MaCurdy 1982 and Abowd and Card 1989).21 The appendix
20The decomposition will also address the problem of measurement error since the misreporting of earnings
by respondents will appear in earnings shocks. However, misreporting probably is not persistent, so the
temporary measure of earnings risk will capture any measurement error and leave the permanent risk measure
uncontaminated.
21Note that σ2u 6= σ2η + σ2v . If we account for the auto-correlation in the temporary shock, we could
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contains details for calculating the estimates of σ2η and σ2v , which shall be represented by
γ and φ .22
2.3.4 Using the earnings risk measures
My use of the earnings risk measures draws inspiration from Carroll & Samwick (1997)
who use them to test various models of precautionary savings and Saks & Shore (2005)
who use them in a model of career choice. I am essentially adapting their strategy for this
particular application.
Recall that I want to know if and how earnings risk can predict whether borrower will
have difficulty servicing their mortgage debt. As an example, when overall risk σˆ2uit =
E[u2it |X ], as measured at origination, is included as an explanatory variable, do increases in
overall risk correspond to higher rates of delinquency later in the life of the mortgage?
The timing of the variables used in the analysis of mortgages will vary depending on
the issue. When we restrict attention to the time of origination (i.e., the vintage year where
t = 0), variables will be denoted z0; this will be true with the risk measures. In other cases,
we will use contemporaneous observations (where t = T ), which will be denoted zT ; this
will be true of realized earnings shocks and the outcome variables (e.g., delinquency). The
exception will be when examining risk in relation to loan terms (e.g., the interest rate). In
that case, I will use the earnings shock at the time the mortgage is granted, u0, so that these
two variables will be measured at t = 0.
A second point worth discussing are the variables that provide variation in predicted
risk independent of the explanatory variables. The variables used to obtain the fitted val-
ues which will be excluded from the coming regressions are occupation, 2-digit-level in-
dustry, SEO status, age, birth group, highest level of education attained, degree of self-
specify it as an MA(2) process, νit = ∑2h=0ψhvi(t−h). Then uit = ∑
a
l=0ηi(t−l)+∑
2
h=0ψhvi(t−h) and E(u2it) =
∑al=0σ2η i(t−l)+∑
2
h=0ψ2hσ
2
vi(t−h).
22The results for the fitted values of total, permanent, and temporary risk are broadly similar to those
reported in Drewianka and Oberg (2014).
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employment, and student status.23 I exclude these variables for a couple reasons. First,
since I am using labor earnings risk, occupation and industry are going to be the main
determinants of the volatility in earnings. Second, earnings risk is what lenders (and bor-
rowers) are using as a measure of credit risk, so the excluded variables have to be something
a lender might use to assess credit risk and approve a mortgage. I do not use race as an
excluded control for earnings risk, but lenders are legally prohibited from using this factor
in their decision. Thus earnings risk as a measure of credit risk should not include it either.
2.4 The Disconnect Between Earnings Risk and Loan Terms
First, I demonstrate that the measures of earnings risk actually correspond to credit risk
by showing that increases in earnings risk measured at the time of origination succeed in
predicting higher rates of delinquency measured at a later time. I will then show, surpris-
ingly, that there is no relationship between individuals’ earnings risk, directly or through
predicted delinquency, and the terms of their mortgage.
2.4.1 Earnings risk predicts delinquency
Table 2.2 presents the results from a Cox Proportional Hazard model of mortgage delin-
quency. The reported coefficients are hazard ratios. Estimates provide the proportional
change in the probability of delinquency during a particular period that is associated with
a 1-unit increase in the explanatory variable, given that the borrower has not been previ-
ously delinquent. The explanatory variables of interest are overall risk, permanent risk, and
temporary risk, all measured when the mortgage was granted and have been normalized
by their standard deviations. Other explanatory variables include individuals’ expected
earnings and their earnings shocks, where the latter are measured at the time the outcome
variables were measured, which represent the realized outcomes of the risks that were mea-
23Given the small sample sizes in the regressions that follow, there is a legitimate concern about over-fitting
the models. However, I experimented with a more extensive list of controls and excluding fewer than those
listed, but the main results remain intact.
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sured at origination. Other controls, also measured at the time of origination, include the
natural logarithm of the monthly payment; race; and a dummy indicating whether there
is more than 15 years left on the mortgage.24 Regressions are stratified by an interaction
between the year the loan was taken out and the U.S. Census region to allow for substantial
differences in the magnitude of housing market shocks. I allowed for within-group hetero-
geneity with a shared frailty (essentially a random effect in this context), but the test statistic
was never even marginally significant. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Results from two specifications are provided. In the left-hand side of the table, the
earnings shock at the time of potential delinquency is paired with either overall risk; the
right-hand side does the same for the decomposition of risk. The results show that increases
in earnings risk increase the chance of delinquency, particularly risk that is temporary in
nature.25 The fact that the risk measures predict delinquency is good news because it
indicates that I am in fact measuring a proxy for credit risk.26
Also note that negative earnings shocks (i.e., decreases in uT or lower than expected
earnings) correspond to higher rates of delinquency. Predicted earnings and the size of the
monthly payment at origination have the expected effects as well.
2.4.2 Earnings risk is unrelated to loan terms
Now that we see earnings risk measures credit risk and predicts default, I want to know if it
has a positive relationship with other forms of credit risk, such as the interest rate.27 Figure
24I have tried including the interest rate in this specification and also for those in section 5. The point
estimate of the hazard ratio for the interest rate was not always statistically significant, and when it was,
the point estimate was always 1. This is not surprising since I already control for the natural logarithm of
the monthly payment (which is determined by the loan amount and interest rate, and sometimes also escrow
payments for insurance or property taxes. In the next subsection, I find that increases in the natural logarithm
of the monthly payment is associated with an increasing interest rate. Including LTV and DTI did not affect
the results either.
25It may come as a bit of a surprise that temporary risk rather than permanent risk predicts delinquency.
One possibility is that borrowers with higher permanent risk were either denied credit by lenders or that
borrowers with higher permanent risk did not bother to apply for a mortgage.
26In some related regressions, increases in earnings risk are also associated with individuals being less
likely to have a mortgage.
27Other loan terms examined were the monthly payment relative to monthly earnings and the interest rate
as a deviation from the average, where the average was taken over state, year, loan length, and interest rate
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2.1 shows a scatter plot of the interest rate (in basis points so that 100=1%) graphed against
overall risk. One can see that there is no clear correlation between the two.28
Table 2.3 further confirms that lack of relationship. The results are from OLS regres-
sions of the interest rate on the earnings and risk profiles. The other covariates are the
natural logarithm of the interest rate, age, race, and dummies for year and region, all mea-
sured at the year of origination. Earnings shocks this time are measured at origination as
well. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. Neither risk nor shocks signifi-
cantly affect the interest rate.
One possibly is that lenders are more concerned about actual delinquency rather than
earnings risk. Because earnings risk predicts delinquency, Table 2.3 includes results where
earnings risk is replaced with the predicted delinquency29 obtained from the regressions in
the last subsection. Since many of the same covariates were used in those regressions, the
only one repeated here is race. I also include fixed effects for the interaction between the
year-region30 of origin to account for the strata in the baseline hazard. Standard errors have
been bootstrapped. Like earnings risk, predicted delinquency has no relationship with the
interest rate.
Thus, while earnings risk can predict delinquency, it does not have a positive relation-
ship with the interest rate, either directly or indirectly. I look for some indication that this
disconnect occurs due to a lack of awareness, or else whether it reflects a knowing decision
by borrowers, lenders, or both.
type (i.e., fixed or variable). The findings for these other loan terms also showed no connections with earnings
risk.
28Plots graphing DTI and LTV versus the interest rate also exhibit no relationship.
29Specifically, this is given by the linear prediction, X βˆ , from the Cox PH model. See the appendix for
details.
30This is also interacted with whether the number of years left on the mortgage is more than 15.
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2.5 Who, If Anyone, Recognizes Earnings Risk?
Since the measure of earnings risk evidently captures what it is intended to capture and that
it affects delinquency, I want to see if lenders and borrowers can recognize and react to it.
It is fair to expect that they should, as they clearly hold much better information than the
econometrician. However, I shall still find that my measure of earnings risk predicts both
borrowers’ beliefs about their potential to fall behind and lenders’ decisions about what to
do with a distressed mortgage.
2.5.1 Borrowers’ anticipation of delinquency
First I investigate whether the disconnect is due to borrowers. Borrowers were asked how
likely they think they are to fall behind on payments, which I term “anticipated delin-
quency.” Table 2.4 presents the findings of a logit31 model on borrowers’ self-reported
chance of missing payments. While it may be asking quite a lot of borrowers to answer a
question like this well, it is certainly the type of question a borrower ought to ask them-
selves when applying for a mortgage.
Again, the outcome and earnings shocks are asked and measured, respectively, at time
t = T , while earnings risk is measured at origination (t = 0). The controls are the same,
except that instead of stratifying on an interaction between year and region of origin, I
include dummies for year of origin and state of origin. The estimates presented are semi-
elasticities, evaluated at the mean value of the covariates, and standard errors are clustered
at the individual level. The estimates represent the proportional (or percentage) change in
anticipated delinquency given, for example, a one standard deviation increase in earnings
risk.
While overall risk does not affect borrowers’ self-reported chance of falling behind
on payments, for the group who thinks they will fall behind, permanent risk does—a 1
31The responses are “very likely” and “not likely.” I do not include “somewhat likely” for comparability
to actual delinquency.
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standard deviation increase in permanent risk raises the the chance borrowers think they
will fall behind by 34 percent (the raw marginal effect for permanent risk is 1 percent).32
This suggests borrowers are aware of and can quantify (in a more informal, back-of-the-
envelope way, perhaps) their earnings risk and chance of delinquency. While this suggests
they have and understand information, I cannot yet say that it is asymmetric (supporting the
hypothesis that borrowers took out mortgages they knew they would have trouble repaying)
until I know if lenders are equally well-informed.
2.5.2 Lenders’ ability to observe earnings risk
When examining if the disconnect is due to lenders, we consider two outcomes that would
directly affect the wealth of those who actually hold a mortgage (who may differ from those
who issued it): foreclosure and restructuring. The survey questions ask borrowers if their
lender has begun the foreclosure process; and separately if their lender has restructured
their mortgage debt. Both foreclosure and restructuring are undesirable outcomes from the
perspective of the lender, since they will have to take some kind of loss on the mortgage.
However, if both borrowers and lenders to restructure and agree to it,33 this is a Pareto
improvement.34 Because of this, we employ a Competing Risks model instead of the Cox
PH model.35 The other controls are the same.36 The coefficients provided are referred to as
sub-hazard ratios and are interpreted the same as the hazard ratios in the Cox model, except
32Further evidence of this is found in another variable in the PSID which asks borrowers if they have
trouble managing their personal finances. While there are no differences in risk for this outcome, those who
respond “yes” experience large negative shocks at t = T compared to those who respond “no” and experience
positive shocks.
33Restructuring may not be possible if, for example, borrowers’ ability to repay is too damaged or if there
were barriers to negotiation.
34It is possible that the lender could be better off under foreclosure if they can get something that is actually
worth more than the house.
35Given the computational complexity of the Competing Risks model, it was not practical to stratify on
the year-region of origin, so I replaced this with continuous explanatory variables that capture what seem to
be the most salient sources of variation across states and years: the annual change in housing prices with the
state and the yearly unemployment rate within the state.
36I also tried including the earnings risk variables as measured at the time of the foreclosure-restructuring
decision (i.e., σˆ2T = ET [σ2|X ]). While they display the same patterns in means as their t = 0 counterparts in
table 2.1B, they were not significant in the regressions here.
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that they correspond to the base category (e.g., foreclosure), not the competing category
(e.g., restructuring).
The right-hand side of the table 2.5A presents the findings when restructuring is the
base category and foreclosure the competing category. The risk measures known at origi-
nation determine the restructuring decision as increases in all of them increase the chance
of restructuring. The actual earnings shock experienced is also quite influential. This im-
plies that, in the case of restructuring, lenders are at least able to distinguish between the
expected and unexpected components of borrowers’ current earnings.37 Since both per-
manent and temporary risk influence the decision to restructure, I rerun the restructuring
specifications to determine if they have distinct effects (i.e., do lenders distinguish between
the two types of risk). After conditioning on overall risk (which includes permanent risk),
permanent risk still has its own effect.
The left-hand side of the table presents the findings when foreclosure is the base cat-
egory and restructuring is the competing category. None of the earnings risk measures is
predictive of foreclosure, but the lack of precision is likely due to the small number of bor-
rowers in this category. However, it appears that the lender may able to make a distinction
between the duration of the shock—specifically, while still insignificant, it is permanent
risk which appears more important.
Based on the evidence I have found, it can be seen that the disconnect between earnings
risk and the interest rate is due to lenders ignoring it despite being able to recognize risk
and to distinguish between the nature of the risk. This and the finding that borrowers are
aware of (the consequences) of earnings risk, suggests that while the typical asymmetric
information hypothesis cannot be ruled out, it may be somewhat different since both sides
seem to be potentially responsible for the disconnect. While lenders respond to earnings
risk and can also distinguish between its type, this is only preliminary evidence that there
37Like delinquency, the fact that permanent risk is not predictive of any of the distress outcomes may occur
because lenders denied these borrowers credit or borrowers did not apply for a mortgage.
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is a supply side contribution to the disconnect.38 I therefore explore this in more detail.
2.6 Roles for Subprime Lending
One common hypothesis for the disconnect may arise is due to federal homeownership
policies attempting to increase homeownership among certain groups, like those with low
incomes,39 who were then channeled into subprime mortgages. The policy thus created
incentives for lenders to ignore or discount risk. To test the possible roles specific to the
the subprime mortgage market, I return to the interest rate-predicted delinquency regres-
sions by supplementing the data using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for
the years 2001-2010.40 Three controls will allow me to see if factors associated to local
subprime lending in general, and federal involvement in the housing market in particular,
played a role. The first two variables provide the rate of subprime mortgage origination in
every state and year during this time period for conventional and government-insured (e.g.,
insured by the Federal Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, etc.), where the
latter can help test for any lender moral hazard. The last is the state-year rate of conven-
tional subprime mortgage originations for home purchases, where the rates are allowed to
differ by race, so that I can test the validity of certain targeted housing policies (e.g., the
CRA).
The association between risk of delinquency and the interest rate was shown to be non-
existent for the entire sample. However, it is possible that the expected positive relationship
could reveal itself in state-years where the rates of subprime lending were lowest, lowest
being defined as rates in the bottom third of the lending rate distribution for that state-
38Also, the lenders responding to the realized risk are not necessarily those who originated the mortgage.
39Or also certain racial groups. Rerunning the regressions from sections 4 and 5 by interacting risk with
the race dummies did not indicate that minorities were more likely to be delinquent, face different interest
rates, or undergo foreclosure
40These HMDA data files (http://www.metrotrends.org/natdata/hmda/hmda_ download.cfm) and
the procedures for constructing them were initially developed by the Urban Institute to sup-
port DataPlace (www.dataplace.org). The data are licensed under the Open Database License
(http:/www.metrotrends.org/natdata/ODbL.cfm).
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year (i.e., the mortgage market may have functioned normally during state-years with low
incidence of subprime lending). Table 2.6 presents OLS results like those in section 4 for
the interest rate regressed on predicted delinquency and a white/non-white indicator, but
just for the sample of low state-year subprime lending rates. Fixed effects for the local
housing market conditions are again included (defined on an interaction between region-
year of origin and whether there are more than 15 years left on the mortgage).41
While most of the coefficients on predicted delinquency display the correct sign, none
of them are statistically significant or look different from those in Table 2.3. However, I
point out that the sample sizes are quite low. Thus, of all the explanations we can examine,
only those on the demand side of the mortgage lending market appear to be responsible for
the disconnect.
2.7 Conclusion
Evidence presented here documented a peculiar feature of the mortgage market in the years
leading up to the recent financial crisis. Using labor earnings risk as a measure of credit risk
at the time of origination, I am able to predict eventual borrower delinquency. However,
earnings risk is not priced into the mortgage (either directly or indirectly through predicted
delinquency), as shown by a disconnect between it and the interest rate. The evidence also
suggests that the disconnect is in part due to borrowers ignoring this earnings risk. I found
no evidence for the supply side explanations I was able to test such as moral hazard arising
through government-insured loans, homeownership policies targeting minority groups, or
local conditions in the sub-prime housing market. However, given the small samples sizes
and evidence found elsewhere (Agarwal et al. 2012), this rejection should be taken with
a grain of salt. Also, since lenders can recognize earnings risk and attempt to mitigate its
consequences, it seems highly unlikely that an explanation does not exist.
41I experimented with other specifications using these controls such as defining the strata differently and
including the lending variables as controls in various forms. All showed no relationship.
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Because the owner of the mortgage at this stage may not be the originator, future work
could focus on one of the very important supply side hypotheses I was not able to test:
the resale of mortgages by originators into the secondary market. In principle, one could
use state resale rates to see if the disconnect between delinquency and loan terms is more
severe in states which had a higher percentage of mortgages resold. If this is the case,
policy could have lenders hold onto mortgages they originate for a longer period of time.
Since they would bear the risk for a duration of the loan, they would have an interest to
price risk into them.
Given some of the data limitations when testing the supply side hypotheses, it would
be beneficial to obtain information at a smaller geographic level, say the county. Only
being able to define local housing markets by region and even states results in the loss of
variation within those areas. Also, while there was quite a bit of data on conventional sub-
prime mortgages, analogous variables for government sub-prime mortgages would provide
a more certain rejection of those hypotheses.
Lastly, regardless of how I would specifically proceed, it would be highly desirable to
obtain more detailed loan-level data on the variables I mentioned were missing, especially
those related the acceptance and denial of credit. This would go a long way in providing a
broader and more complete picture.
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H.R. S.E. P-val. H.R. S.E. P-val.
A-E Profile
  u T : Earnings Shock 0.58
*** 0.11 0.00 0.59*** 0.11 0.00
Risk
  E 0(u
2/σ u-sq. |X ): Overall 1.39
** 0.23 0.05
  E 0(γ /σ γ |X ): Permanent 0.94 0.11 0.58
  E 0(φ /σ φ |X ): Temporary 1.43
***
0.26 0.05
Table 2.2: Effects of Realized Shocks & Risk on Delinquency, Actual
Delinquency, Actual: Behind on Mortgage Payments?
Results are from a Cox PH model. Earnings risk measures are normalized by their standard deviations. 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Stratified by region-year of origin. Controls measured at 
origination are predicted earnings, the natural logarithm of monthly payment, and race. Also included is an 
indicator for whether the remaining term of the mortgage is greater than 15 years. Estimates are hazard ratios. 
n =889.
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3 The Housing Bubble and the Evolution of the Home-
ownership Gap
3.1 Introduction
While the aggregate homeownership rate in the U.S. has tracked the business cycle fairly
closely over the past two decades, there has been at the same time a trend toward a larger
gap in homeownership between whites and non-whites. Figure 3.1 which plots the white/non-
white homeownership differential biennially for 1999-2009. Indeed the experience over the
most recent business cycle is not uniform, as Figure 3.2 indicates. Here homeownership
rates are plotted separately for whites and non-whites, indexed by the base year 1999.
While there was an increase in homeownership for whites during the boom, this rise is ab-
sent for non-whites and is in fact a small decline. While homeownership fall substantially
for whites during the bust, the drop is much sharper and more severe for non-whites.
There are several potential explanations for this structural trend. To begin with, figure
3.2 shows that during the boom, divergence was not simply the fact that both whites and
non-whites experienced growth, but with ownership among whites outpacing that of non-
whites. This may be somewhat surprising given policies which aim to increase homeowner-
ship among low-income and minority individuals (e.g., the Community Reinvestment Act).
Perhaps they did help low-income persons, but these happened to be predominantly white.
Relative growth in income and other assets for whites could have made it more likely for
them to obtain financing; or they may have been more informed about financing options
given the changes and innovations mortgage financing and products. It is also possible that
non-whites were perceived as too risky, but due to criticisms of excessive risk-taking, this
explanation seems implausible.
Continued and accelerated divergence during the bust may have been due to a greater
incidence of delinquency and foreclosure among non-whites. Income instability, lower
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income, and greater leverage could have made it more difficult to repay mortgages and
keep homes. Non-whites may have been less informed about federal measures to help
with repayment through refinancing or restructuring (e.g., Home Affordable Modification
Program); or the possibility of working directly with their lender. A final possibility which
could have contributed to divergence over both periods is some form of discrimination—
lending and distress relief was more common among whites than non-whites.
This paper examines the divergence in the homeownership gap during the boom and
bust to see which reasons are most plausible. I use a rich set of controls from the PSID to
account for preferences in the willingness to own and also the ability to own; controls for
various forms of assets, debt, income, and risk allow me to investigate the unique environ-
ment and developments within the mortgage market during the last decade. In addition
to standard demographic and employment controls, these others include factors affect-
ing mobility, household formation, creditworthiness, and wealth. I employ the methods
of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) who decompose the changes in differentials into ex-
plained/observed components and unexplained/residual components.
I find that the majority of the changes in the homeownership gap over both the boom
and bust years are largely explained by family structure. Other factors like geography,
earnings risk, income and wealth, and education actually contribute to its decrease. Thus
some of the earlier explanations for the divergence during the boom do not seem to hold
water. The change in the residual component contributes relatively less, but still is a sizable
portion and is attributable to either unobservable characteristics or discrimination.
Family structure is still the largest contributor during the bust, but a greater array of
factors matter: geography, earnings risk, and education. The contribution of earnings risk
suggests that lenders were relatively more risk averse when it came to lending to or perhaps
helping distressed non-white borrowers; the contribution of education may suggest that
non-white borrowers were less aware of avenues which could help them keep their homes.
Again, even though a sizable fraction of the gap in any given year remains unexplained,
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the residual component still changes relatively little compared to the predicted component.
In fact, the change in the residual component is negligible, casting doubt on the role of
unobserved characteristics or discrimination playing a role during the bust.
3.2 Related Work
This section only details recent research regarding the homeownership gap; a lengthy and
comprehensive report by Herbert et al. (2005) reviews the literature up until that time.
That report followed President George W. Bush’s 2002 call to increase homeownership
among minority and low-income persons and measures to help with financing. One of the
important points that this report identifies is that almost no study exists that accounts for
selection into homeownership through such channels as the household formation decision,
household mobility, preferential tax treatment for homeowners, income risk, and other sup-
ply factors. However, they note, and Haurin and Rosenthal (2008) find, that accounting for
the household formation decision is not particularly important: it only matters for a cou-
ple percentage points of the homeownership gap for a subset of homeowners, particularly
younger households. Therefore in what I estimate, I do not jointly model and estimate one
of these demand determinants, but still control for many of them.
I start my analysis in 1999, and studies which have looked at changes in the home-
ownership gap up until that time have found the following. Coulson and Dalton (2010)
use Census data from 1960-2000 and find little change in the gap. They point out that
changes in how observables affect homeownership would have caused the gap to narrow
significantly, if not close, by now, but were offset by opposite changes in the residual com-
ponent. Using the Current Population Survey for 1989 and 1999, Bostic and Surette (2001)
find that the homeownership gap between middle- and low-income owners decreased, but
that observables can only explain this decline for owners in the top 40 percent of the in-
come distribution. The decrease is sharpest for the poorest and minorities, but it is left
largely unexplained. This is attributed to housing policy and favorable mortgage lending
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and marcoeconomic conditions during this period.
The most relevant and similar work is that of Fesselmeyer et al., specifically a 2014
working paper, which utilizes the Census’ American Community Survey (ACS). They also
decompose the changes in the homeownership gap into explained and unexplained por-
tions. However, because they use quantile regression, they are mainly concerned with the
information available at the ends of the homeownership distribution; and they only investi-
gate the bust, not the boom as well. This is important not just because they haven’t studied
this part of the most recent business cycle, but also because the change in the homeown-
ership gap is not cyclical over this period, at least for the mean (i.e., the homeownership
gap does not converge during the boom). My results regarding marital status are consistent
with what they find for those at the middle of the homeownership distribution.42
This should perhaps not be surprising. In an investigation on default and foreclosure,
Bayer et al. (2013) uncover that minorities are more likely, compared to whites, to be-
come delinquent on their mortgages, default, and lose their homes. These propensities are
even higher within racial groups for those in low employment areas and with high debt-
to-income ratios (DTI). The findings are even more pronounced to those considered to be
sub-prime and for mortgages originated at the peak of the bubble. The former point found
here, and other studies using credit score information, motivates the inclusion of earnings
risk measures. Oberg (2015) showed that these were a strong predictor of mortgage distress
including delinquency and restructuring, and were associated with whether or not one had
a mortgage. The bust years are also of strong interest since the official homeownership rate
likely overstates that effective rate by more than 5 percent as argued in Haughwout et al.
(2010).
While recession years are typically of more interest than expansion years, especially for
policy, boom years affect on the homeownership gap should not be ignored since they can
42During the boom period, Fesselmeyer et al. (2013) decomposed changes in the house value gap, em-
ploying the same methods and using the American Housing Survey. Fesselmeyer et al. (2012) decomposed
differences in the homeownership gap, again using quantile regression, but for 2007 only (i.e., they didn’t
look at changes or divergence pre-crash).
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perhaps shed some light on what followed (as Bayer et al. 2013 make clear and what factors
determine the long-run trend). Additionally, while Fesselmeyer et al. (2014) have a sizable
amount of important controls, the PSID has its own unique controls I use for geography,
income and wealth, and risk which allow me to evaluate some additional hypotheses.
3.3 Empirical Method
The main analysis below employs the methods developed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
(1991) in their examination of the change in the black-white wage gap and subsequently
used by Blau and Kahn (1996, 1997) in their studies of the gender wage gap. The methods
decompose the divergence in the homeownership gap into those which can be explained by
changes to observed characteristics (e.g., individuals’ levels of income, wealth, or earnings
risk) and the prices or returns to these characteristics (e.g., how important or how strongly
income, wealth, and earnings risk are to lenders); and to a part that is left unexplained,
possibly due to between-group inequality (e.g., discrimination) and within-group inequality
(e.g., because of immigration).
More formally, consider a linear probability model for homeownership
yigt = Xigtβt + eigt , (28)
where yigt equals 1 for individual i in group g (white or non-white) for year t (1999, 2005,
or 2009) if they own their home and 0 if they rent; Xigt are their observed characteristics;
βt are the observed prices or returns to characteristics in year t; and eigt are the residuals,
where it is assumed that E(eigt) = 0.
Suppressing the individual and group subscripts, the homeownership gap can be ex-
pressed as
yWt− yNWt = (XWt−XNWt)βt +(eWt− eNWt) , (29)
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or
∆yt = ∆Xtβt +∆et . (30)
This gives rise to a form of the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. The first term
on the right-hand side of equation (30), ∆Xtβt , is the explained part of the overall difference
and the last term, ∆et , is the residual or unexplained part.
To further help understand the change in the homeownership gap, the residuals can be
decomposed into two parts
eigt = ωt · εigt . (31)
The term εigt is individual i’s standardized residual and ωigt a loading factor that allows for
changes within the white/non-white residual distributions. Equation (30) then becomes
∆yt = ∆Xtβt +ωt∆εt . (32)
With this standardization of the residuals, the divergence in the homeownership gap is
∆y2−∆y1 = [(∆X2−∆X1) ·β1+∆X1 · (β2−β1)]
+ [(∆ε2−∆ε1) ·ω1+∆ε1 · (ω2−ω1)] . (33)
The top line of equation (33) is a breakdown of changes in the predicted or explained gap.
The first term reflects changes in characteristics that may contribute to the divergence in
the homeownership gap. For instance lower marriage rates for non-whites could lead to
divergence. Divergence could also be due to changes in observed prices of or returns to
characteristics. As an example, during the bust, as lenders became more risk averse, they
may have been less willing to lend to non-whites who would be considered subprime due
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to their high DTI’s, low wealth, or high earnings risk.
The second line of equation (33) has analogous counterparts. The first term reflects the
change in the homeownership gap due to changes residual rankings of individuals. This
is usually attributed to changes in unobserved characteristics that are not controlled for
or discrimination. The second term reflects changes in residual inequality or unobserved
prices: the homeownership gap could change because of immigration.43
3.4 Data Description & Sample
The data are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), where the main
variable of interest asks respondents whether they own their own home or rent. This vari-
able runs the full length of the PSID, the present study focuses on the period of interest
1999-2009.44 The trend in homeownership does match these other sources pretty well with
a couple minor exceptions. Figure 3.3 plots the homeownership rate for 1970-2009 using
data from the Census and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). While the PSID
data track the Census series pretty closely, the former is a little more volatile during the
first couple decades and more pro-cyclical during the last couple of decades. In both series,
one can see that for most of the 70s, 80s, and then into the 90s, the rate was relatively stag-
nant, at just under two thirds of the population. Then in the mid-1990s the rate takes of,
increasing until the recent recession, where it began to plummet, almost back to the point
to where its ascent began.
Tables 3.1 & 3.2 provide an overview of selected factors affecting the willingness and
ability to own a home and how they differ across whites/non-whites. Because interest lies
change of the homeownership gap, for each variable I provide samples means or shares for
each group in each year I will be using. I also calculate the differences between groups in a
43In the empirical implementation below, a third term in both the predicted and residual gap changes which
captures simultaneous changes in quantities and prices. Though it is calculated, it is not presented. Also, an
extended discussion of the residual decomposition is provided in the appendix for the interested reader.
44The last available year for the PSID, 2011, is excluded due to a large jump in the homeownership rate.
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given year, along with the changes in these differences by comparing the beginning of the
boom to its end (and likewise for the bust). I include standard demographic and employ-
ment controls such as age, education, marital status, self-employment status. Also included
are measures of, earnings, wealth, and debt-to-income (DTI);45 and some geographic indi-
cators. There are about 3,000-3,500 observations for each year used in the decomposition,
about two-thirds of which correspond to white individuals. Data are for non-disabled men,
ages 24-62, reporting at least 52 hours of annual hours and positive earnings. During this
period, there are 24,406 observations for 6,514 people.
Over the course of the boom, the gap between household earnings and wealth increased
between blacks and whites, as did household leverage (i.e., DTI). The change in relative
education shares increased (decreased) at the high school graduate (dropout) level. While
unemployment in state of residence actually rose for both groups, the differential fell;46
Looking at just highly urbanized areas (that which are in metro areas of 1 million or more
people), while there are significant differences between the groups, there was only a small
change in these differences. Further, there were no huge changes in earnings risk.47 The
starkest changes took place regarding marital status. Over the course of the boom, there was
an increase in the gap between the shares of white/non-white persons who were married,
single, and divorced/separated.48 In fact, the percentage of non-whites who are married is
falling much faster than among whites.
Some of the qualitative patterns are the same when looking at the bust, such as factors
in the income and wealth and education panels (and even shrink in magnitude). One factor
45Permanent earnings are the predicted earnings from equation (25) in the Appendix. Debts include credit
card debt, student loans, medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives; and net wealth (which can be
negative) where the debts are the same as listed and assets include IRAs, stocks, annuities; checking and
savings accounts; CDs and other bonds; life insurance; and employer pension. Mortgage debt is not included.
46In the analysis below, I included the unemployed, but found no changes in the results.
47Earnings risk is measured as in Drewianka and Oberg (2014) who combined and extended the methods
developed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), along with Carroll and Samwick (1997). Since it is not a major
contributor to the change in the homeownership gap, and thus not central to this study, an outline of the
additional data and methods used for earnings risk are available in the appendix for the interested reader.
48This may partly explain the increase in the share of white households relative to non-whites who have a
wife working at least half-time.
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that changes sign is state unemployment rate which shows convergence between the two
groups. Again, the glaring factor is marital status, which continues its strong divergence
relative to other factors. Geography is quite large compared to the boom, indicating that
relative urbanization fell.
3.5 The Change in the Homeownership Gap
I know decompose changes in the homeownership gap into predicted and residual compo-
nents. The controls used are grouped into broad categories: income and wealth includes
permanent and household earnings, realized earnings shocks, DTI, and wealth; risk in-
cludes permanent and temporary risk; age is defined by age groups; education has maxi-
mum education which can be high school graduates or at least some college; employment
has degree of self-employment, state unemployment rate, and whether the wife is at least
half-time; family structure includes marital status and the number of children in the house-
hold; finally, geography contain the total number of times moved while the individual was
in the survey (relative to the number of years they were in the survey), whether residence
is in their state of birth, region of birth, whether they live in an urban or rural area and if
urban (and how urban it is), Census division, and house price index from Freddie Mac.
3.5.1 The bubble, 1999 to 2005
The top panel of Table 3.3 provides the decomposition for the beginning and end of the
bubble years, along with the difference in each component. One can see that for both 1999
and 2005, most of the gap in homeownership is residual, but the majority of the change
in that gap is due to predicted factors—the total homeownership gap went up by over 2.5
percent and a little more than 1.5 percent of that is due to observable controls. What is
perhaps surprising is that the change in the gap is positive: during the expansion of the
housing bubble, homeownership rates diverged.
The factors that stand out in increasing the predicted gap have changes that are primarily
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due to changes in observed quantities. Columns will not add up to the totals (overall,
quantity, and price) at the top of this panel since not all factors from the decomposition are
listed. Similarly, the overall change due to each factor will not necessarily equal the sum
of its quantity and price effects because the contribution due the the interaction between
simultaneous changes in quantities and prices is not listed.
In addition to explaining some of the within-group changes in homeownership, the
largest contributor to the divergence in homeownership over the bust is family structure,
marital status and fertility. This is a quantity effect, so the relative shares of those single
and divorced/separated, and number of children in the household saw earlier increased for
non-whites. The only other factor that acted to increase the gap was age, but this is not a
large amount.
The remaining observables worked in the opposite direction, but not enough to offset
the increase. Their changes are mostly due to changes in prices, or their return. Among
the larger contributors are earnings risk and income and wealth. The positive quantity
effects for these variables show that they increased homeownership for whites relative to
non-whites. However, the negative price effects suggest that lenders became less sensitive
to earnings risk, income, and wealth for non-whites, meaning that they were more willing
to grant mortgages to borrowers who could be considered high-risk. This is consistent
with what has been observed in the mortgage market during the boom, particularly the
subprime portion. Some explanations could be a decrease in discrimination in lending49
or homeownership policies like the Community Reinvestment Act. The last contributor to
the decrease is geography, mainly driven by, oddly perhaps, states in the Census-defined
West-South-Central division (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas).
While the change in the residual gap is less than the predicted gap, it is still sizable.
Since it is a quantity effect, it is mostly the result of changes in residual positions between
whites and non-whites which can be due to discrimination (within-group inequality actually
49This would be a decrease in discrimination based on these factors. The increase in the residual gap,
because it was a quantity effect, suggests that unexplained discrimination may have risen.
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led to a decrease in the residual gap).
3.5.2 The bust, 2005 to 2009
Table 3.4 provides analogous results for what I have defined as the beginning and end of the
bust of the housing bubble. Following the crash in the housing market, the homeownership
gap increased further, as seen in the top panel. The divergence is now larger than during
the boom, which is likely to be expected. Surprisingly though, almost the entire divergence
is due to predictable factors (even though a sizable within-year portion is still residual).
There are some other noteworthy differences. While family structure is still the main
driver, it is smaller than during the boom, and a much larger set of factors contributed to
the continued divergence. In fact, the only set of factors contributing to convergence is
income and wealth, even though it rose for whites relative to non-whites. Given that the
price effect is still negative, lenders still do not care as much about these factors. This could
be the result of policies aimed to help distressed borrowers keep their homes, an example
being the Home Affordable Modification Program.
Earnings risk matters more during this period, actually reversing its pattern from the
previous period. Now it seems that lenders are less likely to extend mortgages to high-risk
non-whites; the quantity effect is even smaller this time, indicating the their was no relative
change in earnings risk between the groups.
Two other sets of factors contributed to the divergence. The first is education, which
is almost entirely its return (i.e., there was no relative increase or decrease in educational
attainment during this period). Perhaps non-whites are less informed about policies they
can use or measures they can take to keep their homes if they are having trouble making
payments. Second, the return to living in certain geographic areas rose. This was driven by
a couple of the more rural counties and states in the West-South-Central Census division
and now also West division (which can be pretty rural themselves: Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming).
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Finally, the overall change in the residual gap is small, and its source is within-group
inequality rather than changes in uncontrolled for characteristics or discrimination.
3.6 Conclusion
Minorities were hit much harder by the collapse of the housing market. Here it was shown
as a dramatic relative reduction in their rates of homeownership. Yet, perhaps surprisingly,
most of the changes in the differences of homeownership are largely attributable to observ-
able characteristics, notably family structure and geography (and also earnings risk): very
little is due to the change in the residual component. In fact, it is during the housing boom
that changes in the residual component of homeownership are larger.
These findings complement recent work on changes in the homeownership gap, partic-
ularly what Fesselmeyer et al. (2014) found for those at the median of the homeownership
distribution during the bust. Future work could employ these quantile methods during the
boom years and use the rich set of controls available in the PSID. Previous research that
has modeled the joint homeownership-household formation decision has only shown this to
be important, in terms of coverage and size. Yet as other work points out, homeownership
could be endogenous in other ways. These would also be worth modeling and estimating.
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Year Total
Decomposition of Differentials 
Predicted Residual
    1999 17.28 7.81 9.46
    2005 19.85 9.33 10.52
Change in Total 2.58 1.52 1.06
Overall
Change in Predicted 
Quantity Price
1.52 1.92 -1.48
-0.66 0.63 -1.07
-0.34 0.12 -0.45
0.39 0.41 0.04
-0.53 -0.40 -0.41
-0.26 -0.11 -0.49
3.33 2.00 0.90
Income & Wealth 
Earnings Risk 
Age
Education 
Employment 
Family Structure 
Geography -0.85 -0.63 -0.92
Overall
Change in Residual 
Quantity Price
1.06 1.56 -0.30
Results are for non-disabled men, ages 24-62, who report positive earnings and at least 52 annual 
hours of work.  Differentials and changes in differentials are all multiplied by 100.  The 
interaction between simultaneous changes in prices and quantities is omitted.
Table 3.3: Changes in Differences in the Homeownership Gap - Boom, 1999 to 2005
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Year Total
Decomposition of Differentials 
Predicted Residual
    2005 19.85 9.33 10.52
    2009 22.86 11.85 11.00
Change in Total 3.00 2.52 0.48
Overall
Change in Predicted 
Quantity Price
2.52 1.35 1.72
-0.13 0.18 -0.20
0.50 0.02 0.38
0.07 0.14 0.15
0.36 0.01 0.35
0.12 0.42 0.04
0.97 0.59 0.22
Income & Wealth 
Earnings Risk 
Age
Education 
Employment 
Family Structure 
Geography 0.58 -0.03 0.77
Overall Quantity Price
0.48 0.09 0.32
Results are for non-disabled men, ages 24-62, who report positive earnings and at least 52 annual 
hours of work.  Differentials and changes in differentials are all multiplied by 100.  The 
interaction between simultaneous changes in prices and quantities is omitted.
Table 3.4: Changes in Differences in the Homeownership Gap - Bust, 2005 to 2009
Change in Residual
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Appendix A: Distribution of Statistics
Note that γ can be written as
γitk jq =
1
k
(
k
∑
h=1
ηi(t+h)+ vi(t+k)− vit
)(
k+q
∑
h=1− j
ηi(t+h)+ vi(t+k+q)− vi(t− j)
)
=
1
k
(
k
∑
h=1
η2i(t+h)+2
k
∑
h=1
∑
r>h
ηi(t+h)ηi(t+r)
)
+
1
k
(
k
∑
h=1
ηi(t+h)
)(
vi(t+k+q)− vi(t− j)+
0
∑
h=1− j
ηi(t+h)+
k+q
∑
h=k+1
ηi(t+h)
)
+
1
k
(
vi(t+k)− vit
)(
vi(t+k+q)− vi(t− j)+
k+q
∑
h=1− j
ηi(t+h)
)
. (34)
Under the assumptions of the earnings model, the expected value of first term in (34) is
E(1k ∑
k
h=1η
2
i(t+h)) =
1
k ∑
k
h=1σ
2
η i(t+h), and every other term is the product of mean-zero, un-
correlated random variables and are thus themselves mean zero. Therefore, for all j and
q, γitk jq is an unbiased estimator of the mean variance of permanent shocks facing person
i between times t and t + k. However, since γitk jq is likely a very noisy estimator, we have
proposed to estimate of σ2η it by E(γit |X) (see equations 15 and 8).
While one could in principle compute E(γik jq|Xit) as fitted values from a regression of
the various γitk jq statistics on Xit , this is not efficient because equation (34) also suggests the
γitk jq statistics are heteroskedastic because (even for a given k) the right-hand side includes
more terms when j and q larger (or perhaps because the distributions of the η ′s and v′s
may change over time). It would thus be more efficient to weight by the inverse variance
of each when estimating regression (8).
We approximate those variances under the assumption that η and v are homoskedastic
over time, i.e., E(η2it) = σ2η i and E(v2it) = σ2vi; it would then follow that the variance of γitk jq
is a quadratic function of ( j+ q). For example, if (simply for the sake of specificity) we
also assumed that shocks η and v were normally distributed, each term in (34) other than
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the first would be a product-normal random variable. If G(σ2y ,σ2z ) denotes the cumulative
distribution function for a random variable created by multiplying two mean-zero normally
distributed random variables with variances σ2y and σ2z , it follows that k(k− 1+ j+ q) of
those remaining terms in (34) are distributed 1k G(σ
2
η i,σ2η i), another 2(2k+ j+q) terms are
distributed 1k G(σ
2
vi,σ2η i), and the last four are distributed
1
k G(σ
2
vi,σ2vi). Since each of those
components is, for a given k, either a constant or linear in ( j+q), the variance of γitk jq is a
quadratic function of ( j+q).
We thus use the following feasible implementation. First, each γitk jq is calculated and
used to compute an unweighted estimate γ̂it as the fitted value from ordinary least squares
estimation of the regression analogous to (8). The squared residuals ε2 ≡ (γitk jq− γ̂it)2 are
then regressed on a quadratic in ( j+q), a vector of year fixed effects, and those year fixed
effects interacted with ( j+q). (The latter objects are included to relax the homoskedasticity
assumption above.) The fitted values from that second regression
(
E
[
ε2| j+q]) are then
interpreted as estimates of the variance of the γitk jq statistics and used as the inverse weights
to produce our WLS estimates.
Appendix B: Definition of Predicted Delinquency
The motivation for regressing the interest rate on predicted delinquency stems from the
idea that there is an interest rate at which a mortgage loan is profitable. Therefore, rep-
resent a lender’s loss function at origination as G(h0,h1, ...,hT ) where ht is the chance of
delinquency at time t. From the Cox PH model, ht is
h(t;X0) = hog(t)eXβ . (35)
where h(t;X) is the hazard function; hog(t) is the baseline hazard, common to all people
in group g, which I have defined based on year-region of origin; and eXβ is the individual
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hazard where X contains all the covariates listed earlier, including earnings risk.50
Log-linearizing G around h¯ yields
ln(G|h¯) ≈ ln
[
Go(h¯)
]
+
T
∑
t=0
∂ ln
[
G(h¯)
]
∂ht
· [ln(ht)− ln(h¯)] (36)
= K+
T
∑
t=0
k · ln(ht) (37)
for K ≡ ln[Go(h¯)]−∑Tt=0 ∂ ln[G(h¯)]∂ht · ln(h¯), k ≡ ∑Tt=0 ∂ ln[G(h¯)]∂ht , and ln(ht) = ln(hog)+X0β .
Therefore, G is approximately equal to K′g + k′ ·X0β where K′g ≡ K +∑Tt=0 k · ln(hog) and
k′ ≡ (T +1) · k.
The regression for the origination interest rate i0, with predicted delinquency as a re-
gressor, is then
i0 = piog+δrace+κ · (X0βˆ )+ ε, (38)
where piog represents K′g and is composed of the year-region of origin indicators interacted
with whether the loan has more than 15 years left; δrace are dummies for race or white/non-
white; ε is the error; and X0βˆ is the linear prediction from the Cox PH model where the
covariates were measured at origination. While the piog depend on time, they are the same
for everyone in state-region of origin g. The part of the loss function, and thus predicted
delinquency, that lenders are most interested in then is X0βˆ , which does not depend on
time.51 That is why interest lies in κˆ .
50For the lender, the potential loss will depend on more than the sequence of h′s. However, at least some of
these factors are either directly controlled for in the interest rate regressions or indirectly in the delinquency
regressions.
51Certainly some characteristics may change over time and the lender could attempt to forecast these
changes at origination.
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Appendix C: Discussion of Residual Decomposition
To determine positions within the residual distribution of person i who in group g during
year t, assume
τigt = Ft (ωt · εigt) . (39)
The term τigt is their quantile in the residual distribution, Ft . Assuming F−1t is the inverse
of the residual distribution allows one to recover the residual when the quantile is known:
ωt · εigt = F−1t (τigt) . (40)
These assumptions help in understanding the two residual terms in equation (31). The
first, (∆ε2−∆ε1) ·ω1 measures changes in residual quantiles by utilizing the white residual
distribution from year 1, FW1 and the non-white residuals—εi,NW,1—to find their quantile
in the white residual distribution: FW1 (εi,NW,1) = τ
W
i,NW,1. This quantile for year t
′ is then
used to find the hypothetical or imputed residual for year 1 and compare it with the actual:
F−1W1
(
τWi,NW,2
)
= εWi,NW,1 vs. εi,NW,1.
Lastly, the second residual term in equation (31), ∆ε1 · (ω2−ω1), measures within-
group inequality or changes in the residual distribution because it utilizes the white residual
distribution from year 2, FW2 , to get the quantiles: F
W
2 (εi,NW,2) = τ
W
i,NW,2. These quantiles
are used to get the hypothetical or imputed residual for year 2 and compare it with the
actual residual from year 2: F−1W1
(
τWi,NW,2
)
= εWi,NW,1 vs. εi,NW,2.
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